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 Introduction
Today, many liberal democracies face the menace of Islamic extremist violence.  
Extremists struck the United States.  On 11 September 2001, the terrorist group Al-Qaeda 
attacked the United States, killing over 3,000 Americans.  Australia, too, has been a 
target of violence.  The next year, on 12 October 2002, more than 190 people, including 
over seventy Australians, were killed when the Islamic militant group Jemaah Islamaih 
detonated a bomb in Bali.  Jihadi terrorists hit Spain.  On 11 March 2004, three 
explosions rocked the Madrid commuter train system, resulting in the deaths of 173 
people.  The United Kingdom has also fallen victim to this new campaign.  Fifty-two 
people died on 7 July 2005, when four suicide bombers blew themselves up at various 
points on the London transport system.   
Jihadi terrorism is often portrayed as a threat to the fundamental principles of 
liberty and freedom upon which so many of the first world governments are based.1  It is 
difficult to argue that this new menace does not challenge those beliefs.  The very 
openness of liberal democracies, the rights to privacy and speedy trial and freedoms from 
search and seizure and unwarranted arrest, are tools that a terrorist could use against 
those societies to cause harm.  Aside from being horrific acts of hatred and extremism, 
these attacks focused attention on the need for effective counterterrorism policies that 
deliver security while preserving liberal democratic values and rights.   
Though liberal democracies share the threat of jihadi terrorism, they possess 
divergent histories of past experience with terrorism.  Some, such as the United Kingdom 
                                                 
1 Much debate exists in the academic community about the proper label to apply to the recent terrorist 
activity.  “Jihadi terrorism” is just one of the proposed labels; while not accepted by everyone as the best 
term, it is more precise and accurate than the popular “Islamic terrorism.”  This study thus uses “jihadi 
terrorism” throughout. 
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 or Spain, have waged long-term, extensive counterterrorism campaigns against domestic 
threats.  Others, like the United States and Australia, never faced widespread, determined 
terrorist movements in the past.  The goal of this study is to discover whether liberal 
democracies with extensive previous counterterrorism experience demonstrate greater 
restraint in their policy reaction to international jihadi terror following 11 September 
2001 than those without such experience.  Three questions encourage this study.  First, 
have the governments of certain liberal democracies demonstrated greater restraint in 
their reaction to 9/11?  Second, how has past experience with terrorism affected the 
degree to which government policies have been able to maintain the previous 
counterterrorism equilibrium in dealing with terrorism while confronting the threat of 
jihadi terror?  Third, and most broadly, is past experience with counterterrorism directly 
applicable to combating future terrorism threats? 
In an attempt to address these questions, four case studies are analyzed.  The cases 
of the United Kingdom and Spain, countries with extensive previous experience with 
domestic terrorism, are compared with the cases of the United States and Australia, 
nations with little or no prior exposure to terrorism.  This paper relies on five means of 
assessing the degree to which government policies have shifted from the pre-September 
11 equilibrium in terms of counterterrorism measures.  First, internal governmental 
oversight bodies, such as independent counterterrorism reviewers, are inspected.  Second, 
the opinions of the judiciary in terrorist-related cases are evaluated.  Third, content 
analyses of reports on counterterrorism by external watchdogs such as Amnesty 
International gauge a country’s movement from the societal equilibrium.  Fourth, the 
media perception of the policy movement is examined from articles on counterterrorism 
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 in periodicals.  Fifth, the academic counterterrorism literature is evaluated to determine 
how scholars view the post-9/11 counterterrorism policy of each country. 
It is hypothesized at the outset of this study that, all else being equal, liberal 
democracies with extensive previous counterterrorism experience will be more 
constrained in their policy response to international jihadi terror following 11 September 
2001 than those without such experience.  Essentially, states are believed to undergo a 
trial and error procedure during the period of previous counterterrorism.  Policymakers in 
countries that put counterterrorism regimes in place to combat past terrorism benefit from 
a process of “policy learning.”  Successful policies are apt to be resurrected and 
reapplied, while failures are either discarded or reevaluated and tweaked before being 
used again.  Those countries that have spent years undergoing this process, represented 
by the United Kingdom and Spain, should have better identified which counterterrorism 
policies are effective at simultaneously delivering security and preserving the 
fundamental rights of the society.  Those countries for which jihadi terrorism is their first 
significant terrorist threat, like the United States and Australia, have not experienced such 
a process and thus are less able to identify effectual counterterrorism strategies. 
It would be useful to take a brief look at the history of domestic terrorism in the 
United Kingdom and Spain, as well as a short overview of the jihadi threat.  The United 
Kingdom faced terrorism from the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which practiced 
terrorism from about 1970 through the 1990s.  At the heart of the troubles was the use of 
the British Army to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) which, because of its 
activities toward Catholic protestors in 1969, was seen as a tool of the Protestant majority 
by the Catholics (Roy, 1991).  This perception of bias on the part of the security forces 
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 and the reestablished presence of the Army resulted in the resurrection of both 
Republican and Loyalist paramilitary organizations.  The renewed period of violence that 
lasted from 1969 until the cessation of violent activity proclaimed by the IRA in July 
2005 was marked by the employ of terrorist activity in Britain itself.  While Ireland had 
seen revolutionary terrorism before, the scale was much greater after 1969.  Between the 
years 1969 and 1984, approximately 100 deaths resulted from terrorist activity in Britain 
(Walker, 1986, p. 14).  The spread of violence from Northern Ireland and the specific 
targeting of locations and persons in Britain had strategic motivation.  It was believed 
that bloodshed in Britain would have more impact than that in Northern Ireland, and that 
“in a war of attrition, the British public [will] tire first” (Bell, 1976, p. 71). 
Spain faced a similar separatist movement.  The origin of the modern organization 
known as the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) can be traced to the development of 
contemporary Basque nationalism in the late nineteenth century.  This nationalism led to 
the eventual establishment of the organization in the early 1960s, during the rule of the 
authoritarian dictator, General Francisco Franco.  His brutal and ruthless regime officially 
outlawed the promotion of Basque nationalism, while, in reality, fertilizing the ground 
from which the ETA and its radical Basque patriotism sprang.  The political climate in 
Spain changed dramatically after Franco’s death in November 1975, but these 
transformations failed to spell the end of the ETA.  While many Basques were satisfied 
with the autonomy granted by the referendum on the subject in 1979, calls for full 
political independence still sounded.  According to analysts, some nationalists advocate 
total independence, rejecting the Constitution’s previous insistence on “the indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish nation” (Woodworth, 2001, p. 20).  This demand for sovereignty 
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 over the entirety of the Basque region forms the core of the ETA’s stated goals for 
engaging in domestic terrorism against the Spanish government.   
All four of the selected countries confronted some level of threat from jihadi 
terrorism since 2001.  Al-Qaeda, an Shi’a Islamic extremist organization masterminded 
by Osama bin Laden, is at the vanguard of this form of all-encompassing, religiously-
motivated, international terrorism.  The sophistication, dedication, worldwide reach of the 
jihadi terrorists was something that had never been seen before.  Bruce Hoffman (2006) 
writes that bin Laden “has defined al Qaeda’s fundamental raison d’être in terms of the 
‘clash of civilizations’ religious typology” (p. 93).  Bin Laden couches his terrorism in 
terms of a holy struggle of Islam versus the Infidel, faith versus heresy, virtue versus sin.  
According to this worldview, Islam is under assault from all nonbelievers, which 
encompasses the entirety of the Western world.  Everyone within that world is a target of 
jihadi terrorism.  Bin Laden himself has announced that his organization does “not 
differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians” and has proven 
this on multiple occasions (as cited in Hoffman, 2006, p. 97).  The perceived menace of 
jihadi terror stems not only from Al-Qaeda itself, but from regional affiliates, copycat 
movements, and homegrown groups inspired by the actions and philosophies of the 
jihadists.  Such is the nature of the threat confronting liberal democracies today. 
The literature written on the subject of counterterrorism is primarily atheoretical.  
The vast majority of it consists of narrow studies of particular cases with little 
comparative applicability.  To help fill that gap, this study posits that certain liberal 
democracies are better able to craft a counterterrorism regime that preserves fundamental 
rights, and bases that hypothesis on the premise that policymakers in liberal democracies 
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 learn from their country’s previous experience in dealing with analogous threats.  The 
assumption that policymakers learn is in turn derived from previous scholarship on the 
concept of policy learning.   
This study draws heavily upon what is known as “social learning,” primarily 
applied to domestic economic policymaking previously, in order to formulate the 
theoretical framework (Heclo, 1974; Sacks, 1980; Skocpol, 1985; Weir & Skocpol, 1985; 
Hall, 1993).  This literature states that policymakers do learn, and that the most important 
thing affecting current policy is past policy.  They also identify policy administrators as 
the deciders of policy, rather than politicians, and stress the relative autonomy of such 
decision-makers from society.  Such suppositions carry important implications for the 
study of counterterrorism policymaking.  Policymakers will rely a great deal on past 
experience with terrorism while formulating future counterterrorism policy.  Those 
countries that faced substantial domestic terror threats possess significantly more 
experience for their policymakers to draw upon.  No previous studies have applied the 
theory of policy learning specifically to counterterrorism regimes in liberal democracies; 
in fact, Martha Crenshaw (2000) identified it as a facet of counterterrorism research 
requiring further study. 
In the first section of the paper, the theoretical framework for the rest of the study 
will be developed in more depth.  The second section will contain a review of the 
counterterrorism literature. The third and main part of the study opens with an overview 
of the case studies, as well as an explanation of why they were chosen and how they will 
be examined follow the literature review section.  Then the case studies themselves are 
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 presented.  The paper concludes with a section in which the results of the study are 
analyzed and the implications on counterterrorism policymaking are examined. 
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 Theoretical Framework
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that, all else being equal, one would expect 
liberal democracies with previous domestic counterterrorism experience to demonstrate 
greater restraint in their policy response to international jihadi terror following 11 
September 2001 than those without that experience.  The cases of two countries with 
significant prior struggles with domestic terrorism, the United Kingdom and Spain, as 
well as two countries with little experience with domestic terrorism, the United States and 
Australia, are examined to test this supposition.  The hypothesis is derived from the 
theoretical arguments discussed in detail below. 
 Terrorism itself is a complicated definitional challenge.2  For the purposes of this 
study, terrorism is broadly defined as the systematic employ of illegal violence by an 
actor or group of actors against noncombatants.  Within each case study, terrorism will 
refer to the current definition accepted and used by the country being scrutinized.  Within 
the larger context of terrorism, the particular subcategory of jihadi terrorism concerns this 
study.  Jihadi terrorism is a specific type of international terrorism.  The Palestinian 
Liberation Organization developed the first international terrorism in the late 1960s, 
inaugurating the travel of terrorists from country to country and the targeting of innocent 
civilians from nations that had little or nothing to do with their specific grievances 
(Hoffman, 2006, pp. 63-80).  Jihadi terrorism grew out of this tradition.  While 
religiously-motivated terrorism is nothing new, jihadi terrorism is a relatively recent and 
particularly virulent manifestation of the practice.  It derives impetus from the perceived 
                                                 
2 It has proven impossible to reach a consensus international definition of terrorism.  Each individual 
country must define it within its own legislative or criminal framework.  Some of the complexities of 
international counterterrorism cooperation stem from this lack. For discussions of this difficulty, see: 
Dugard, 1994; Badey, 1998; Annan, 2005. 
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 “crimes and sins committed by the Americans” and their allies and is justified by 
religious-legal statements known as fatwas (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001, appendix 1B, 
pp. 1-2).  First entering the world stage with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade 
Center and the embassy bombings in 1998, the most prominent jihadi terrorist network, 
Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, demonstrated their reach and aims with the bloody attacks 
in the United States in 2001, Spain in 2003, and the United Kingdom in 2005.  Though 
al-Qaeda was responsible for just over 0.1% of terrorist incidents between 1998 and 
December 2007, the organization accounted for 8.0% of terrorism fatalities in the same 
period.3  The four countries examined below face this jihadi terrorism, and their attempts 
to combat its threat motivate this study. 
Discussions of counterterrorism policy and its ramifications on human rights and 
civil liberties are also fraught with difficulties.  This study characterizes the similar but 
slightly different bundle of rights and liberties in each of the four liberal democracies 
mentioned above as fundamental rights.  The term fundamental rights encompasses both 
the human rights, identified in domestic law or through the country’s participation in 
international instruments, and civil liberties, enshrined in constitutions, legal codes, or 
precedents, that are traditionally enjoyed in the country.  Difficulties arise in exploring 
the complex relationship between these fundamental rights and security in liberal 
democracies.  Policymakers in most liberal democracies generally assume that they must 
sacrifice certain rights in order to effectively combat terrorism (Schlagheck & Walker, 
1992; Chalk, 1995; Donohue, 2001, 2005; Tsoukala, 2006).  Many governments in liberal 
                                                 
3 Source: The Rand Corporation Terrorist Incident Database.  According to the database, there were 26,071 
terrorist incidents resulting in 43,381 fatalities between 1998 and December 2007.  Al-Qaeda was 
responsible for 31 attacks and 3,457 deaths.  http://www.tkb.org/RandSummary.jsp?page=about, accessed 
15 December 2007.   
 9
 
 democracies operate under the presumption that constitutional guarantees must be curbed 
to protect individual security because they obstruct the realization of efficient counter-
terrorism policies.  David Blunkett, for example, the former Home Secretary of the 
United Kingdom, suggested that “democratic governments have always had to strike a 
balance between the powers of the state and the rights of individuals” (Blunkett, 2004, p. 
i).  In spite of the numerous academic critiques of the assumption that security and rights 
are necessarily diametrically opposed (Bonner, 1992; Della Porta, 1992; Chalk, 1995; 
Donohue, 2001; Payne, 2002; Waldron, 2003; Tsoukala, 2004; Meisels, 2005), the trade-
off between rights and security has come to dominate debates over counter-terrorism 
policy in liberal democracies.  
It is not the purpose or intention of this study to become embroiled in the debate 
raging in political theory about the relationship between rights and security.  Having 
acknowledged the existence of the dispute, this study is primarily concerned with the fact 
that most policymakers and politicians in liberal democracies see trade-offs between 
fundamental rights and security.  This paper seeks to measure the impact of this 
presupposition on respect for fundamental rights.  As Figure 1 below shows, the 
relationship between fundamental rights and security can be represented as existing on a 
spectrum.  On the far left side, a theoretical society that values only individual rights and 
completely neglects security could be labeled anarchy.  On the other hand, a society that 
concerns itself solely with security to the detriment of rights might be considered a 
totalitarian police state.  Liberal democratic societies, by their very nature, have chosen to 
maintain a certain degree of both rights and security.  Due to this, liberal democracies are 
constrained to the central area of the spectrum, well within both extremes.  Each liberal 
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 democracy determines its location on the continuum, within the limitation, through a 
process of trial and error and societal debate.  Policymakers internalize this debate 
through the process of social learning discussed later in the section.  Liberal democracies 
are assumed to have been at some sort of counterterrorism policy equilibrium prior to the 
11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.  Following this event, liberal 
democracies awoke to the threat of jihadi terrorism and have been pursuing policies 
intended to increase security. 
Anarchy Totalitarian 
Police 
State 
Range for Liberal Democracies 
Fundamental  
Rights Security 
Figure 1: Spectrum of Rights and Security 
Democracy without previous experience 
Democracy with previous experience 
Counterterrorism 
Policy Equilibrium 
9/11/01 
This study hypothesizes that those liberal democracies that faced a sustained 
campaign of terrorism in the past have experienced this societal debate.  Those countries’ 
policymakers and policymaking organizations have internalized the results of the process.  
Due to this internalization, those liberal democracies with extensive previous experience 
with terrorism will see a smaller deviation from the previous equilibrium than those 
countries that lack such a history. 
 The general theory of policy learning provides a sound theoretical footing for this 
comparative study of counterterrorism in liberal democracies.  Significant literature 
addresses the process of policy learning, chiefly from historical examples, but has 
primarily been applied to the field of foreign policy (May, 1973; Jervis, 1976; Long, 
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 1981; Breslauer & Tetlock, 1991; Levy, 1994).  Jack S. Levy (1994) writes that 
“historical learning often occurs,” but the challenge is “to specify when certain actors 
learn what types of lessons from what events, and under what conditions this leads to 
policy change” (p. 280).  Conceptually, learning is defined as “a change of beliefs (or the 
degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or 
procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience” (Levy, 1994, p. 
283).   
Ernest May (1973) produced one of the first studies of historical learning by 
policymakers.  He writes that “framers of foreign policy are often influenced by beliefs 
about what history teaches or portends” (May, 1973, p.iv).  Jervis (1976) identifies the 
impact of learning from history.  Similar prior episodes “provide the statesman with a 
range of imaginable situations and allow him to detect patterns and causal links that can 
help him understand his world” (Jervis, 1976, p.217).  Later studies looked at different 
aspects of the policy learning process, including how governments learn (Etheredge, 
1981; Etheredge 1983).  Breslauer and Tetlock (1991) advance a much more nuanced 
conception of learning.  For them, the policymaker can exhibit a form of “learning that,” 
which “refers to a change in the probability of a response in the face of changing reward 
contigencies” (Breslauer & Tetlock, 1991, 8).  He or she can also “learn how,” which 
implies that the enhancement in “performance in relation to the attainment of certain 
goals…happened as a result of behavioral change that is preceded and driven by 
improvement in the actor’s understanding of his environment” (Breslauer & Tetlock, 
1991, 6).  A researcher guarantees two conditions when reporting that policymakers 
learned how: that actions characterized as negative were not repeated, and the change was 
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 a consequence of internalizing new behavioral patterns based upon disapproving 
feedback.  Breslauer and Tetlock (1991) also make a distinction between simply altering 
behavior and changing beliefs (pp. 10-11).  They rightly point out that a study of 
modifications in beliefs represents a significant empirical challenge and requires 
extensive psychological knowledge that is rarely available.  Only perceptible alterations 
of behavior concern this study. 
 Some investigation has been undertaken of learning in the area of domestic policy 
(Heclo, 1974; Sacks, 1980; Skocpol, 1985; Weir & Skocpol, 1985; Hall, 1993).  The 
most significant contribution has been made in the study of social learning.  Social 
learning is defined as “a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in 
response to past experience and new information,” where learning is signified by policy 
modifications due to that process (Hall, 1993, p. 278).  This study uses the above 
definition of learning.  The idea of social learning suggests ways to consider independent 
state contributions to policymaking, even in constitutional democracies ostensibly 
directed by legislatures and political parties.  The most prominent proponents of the 
theory present three primary characteristics.  First, a general consensus exists that the key 
factor affecting current policy is past policy (Heclo, 1974, p. 315; Weir & Skocpol, 1985, 
p. 119; Hall, 1993, p. 277).  Decision-making is a process of learning, and “the most 
important influence on that learning is previous policy itself” (Sacks, 1980, p. 356).4  
Where this previous policy was devised and implemented in another country under 
directly relatable circumstances, policymakers’ learning sometimes “consisted in 
perceiving and transmitting foreign experience” (Heclo, 1974, p. 310).  Second, the most 
                                                 
4 Some scholars debate, however, whether policymakers learn better from policy failures (see Heclo, 1974, 
p. 303) or policy successes (see Weir & Skocpol, 1985, p. 120). 
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 important agents for carrying out the learning process are policy administrators, rather 
than politicians.  Heclo (1974) reports that “[f]orced to choose one group among all the 
separate political factors as most consistently important…the bureaucracies of Britain and 
Sweden loom predominant in the policies studied” (p. 308).  Third, the concept of social 
learning accentuates the ability of the state to act separately from societal demands.  
Heclo (1974) discards the idea that socioeconomic development, elections, political 
parties, and special interest groups play a decisive role in policy formation, and 
cautiously suggests that policymaking is elite-driven rather than pluralistic (p. 318).  
Sacks (1980) goes a bit farther, claiming that social learning exposes “the substantial 
autonomy of the state from societal pressures in its formulation of policy goals” (p. 356). 
 The three broad characteristics of the social learning paradigm possess major 
implications for the study of counterterrorism policy in liberal democracies.  First, the 
assumption that previous policy is influential in the formation of new policy reinforces 
the hypothesis that the policymaking process will be affected by a country’s prior 
experience in combating terrorism.  Additionally, based upon a close reading of the social 
learning literature, one would expect that policy experts will maintain continuity and 
internalize the lessons learned from application of counterterrorism policies in the past, 
despite political shifts or changes in socioeconomic situations.  These policy experts need 
not necessarily be the same individuals to continue previous policies; as Weir and 
Skocpol (1985) point out, “policy intellectuals,” whether or not personally involved in the 
formulation of the previous policy, will all “consciously build on and/or react against 
previous governmental efforts for dealing with the same (or similar) problems” (p.119).  
Governments persist with policies they perceive as effective, despite pressure to remove 
 14
 
 it, due to the autonomy of the state in terms of policy formation.  An application of the 
social learning paradigm to counterterrorism policymaking suggests that those countries 
which previously formulated counterterrorism policies in the face of terror threats will 
internalize the lessons of their experience and learn from them.  Yet the autonomy of the 
state desensitizes policymakers to society’s preferences regarding rights, which might 
result in counterterrorism policies that are inconsistent with public opinion.   
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 Literature Review
The literature surrounding the study of counterterrorism measures reflects the 
nature of the subject itself.  It is a rapidly evolving, primarily atheoretical body of work.  
Martha Crenshaw (2000) notes that “both the study of terrorism and counterterrorism 
policy have been event-driven” (p. 415) and lack empirical evidence and theoretical 
grounding.  She goes on to inquire “how do governments learn from past experiences in 
dealing with terrorism?” (Crenshaw, 2000, p. 417), and identify it as a question requiring 
further study.  
Currently, the vast majority of studies on terrorism are occupied with one of two 
goals: illuminating the history and development of particular groups, or discussing 
terrorism in general terms.  Few comparative studies of counterterrorism policies across 
different nations exist.  Among those that have been undertaken, many focus on a single 
aspect of counterterrorism policy.  A popular topic recently has been the international and 
national legal frameworks for counterterrorism, including treatment of emergency 
legislation and of penal codes (Walter, Vöneky, Röben, & Schorkopf, 2004; Ramraj, Hor, 
& Roach, 2005; Gross & Aoláin, 2006).5  Some studies have focused on counterterrorist 
campaigns conducted by liberal democracies.  Among the best are those edited by Alex 
Schmid and Ronald Crelinsten (1993), David Charters (1994), Fernando Reinares (2000), 
Yonah Alexander (2006), and Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (2007).  
 The Schmid and Crelinsten volume contains seven case studies, but is confined to 
Europe and includes three nations that have little experience with terrorism—the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria.  Charters examines six case studies, but looks 
                                                 
5 Legislation and other legal mechanisms for the prevention of terrorism are often referred to as anti-
terrorism in the literature.  Counterterrorism, in the context of this paper, refers to the comprehensive 
regime to combat terrorism, including legal mechanisms. 
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 only at the impact of international terrorism on the nexus between security and civil 
liberties prior to 1994.  The study states that liberal democracies can learn from each 
other’s successes and failures in counterterrorism to limit repressive reaction to new 
terrorist threats (Charters, 1994, pp.223-226).  Reinares’s compilation presents case 
studies of the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Italy, but focuses on the potential for 
European intergovernmental cooperation to combat terrorism.  Alexander’s book 
analyzes the success of counterterrorism policies in a large number of cases (the United 
States, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Spain, the United Kingdom, Israel, Turkey, India, and 
Japan), but does not draw lessons from the cases to apply to jihadi terrorism.   
Art and Richardson’s work examines the cases of Italy, the United Kingdom, 
Spain, France, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Israel, Turkey, Russia, India, Sri Lanka, and 
Japan.  The explicit goal of the study is to analyze democratic counterterrorism strategies 
and draw lessons from those experiences to be applied to present and future 
confrontations with terrorism (Art & Richardson, 2007).  The implication is that previous 
experience with terrorism produces lessons that are directly applicable to the current 
jihadi threat.  The book makes little indication, however, of the extent to which the 
governments that faced this threat internalized these lessons themselves and adjusted 
their own counterterrorism policies accordingly. 
 The literature on counterterrorism is exceedingly thin in its discussion of 
policymaker learning.  For the most part, this discourse consists of pithy allusions to 
familiarity with terrorism.  For example, Louise Richardson (2007) mentions in her 
chapter on Britain and the IRA that the prime minister’s reaction to the 7 July bombings 
“bespoke his experience in dealing with terrorism” (p. 99).  Other authors reference 
 17
 
 learning in a confined counterterrorism environment, primarily in discussions of military 
activities.  Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw (2000) refer to the lack of learning 
by the British from counterterrorism campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus, where 
“the same mistakes in organization and intelligence were repeated, with the lessons of the 
earlier conflict seemingly ignored” (p. 8).  This indication is of limited applicability to 
this study, as it encompasses primarily military responses in a colonial setting, with 
decision-making concentrated in the hands of a military leadership rather than a civilian 
government and bureaucracy.   
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 Case Study Overview
 In order to test the hypothesis that, all else being equal, one should expect liberal 
democracies with extensive previous counterterrorism experience to demonstrate greater 
restraint in their policy response to jihadi terrorism following 9/11 than those without 
experience, four case studies were examined in this study.  The cases were scrutinized to 
ascertain the degree to which government policies in each country shifted away from the 
particular equilibrium in place on 11 September 2001.   
 All four case studies fulfilled two criteria.  First, those countries chosen needed to 
be established, stable liberal democratic states.  The hypothesis only extends to liberal 
democratic countries, as policymaking is qualitatively different in other governmental 
types.  Second, the nations had to face a high level of threat—real or perceived—from 
jihadi terrorism.  The purpose of this study is to evaluate the change in counterterrorism 
policy among the countries following 11 September 2001, when the perceived reach and 
destructive capability of jihadi terrorism truly entered the consciousness of Western 
liberal democratic governments.  In addition to these two general criteria, the study 
necessitated two countries with extensive previous counterterrorism experience, while the 
other two needed to lack this experience.  This was done in order to compare the effect of 
the independent variable of extensive previous counterterrorism experience on liberal 
democracies’ responses to 9/11. 
The United Kingdom and Spain were selected as the two cases with extensive 
previous experience with counterterrorism.  The United Kingdom faced a sustained 
terrorism campaign by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) for thirty years, from 1969 until 
the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.  The nation also made troop contributions to both 
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 Iraq and Afghanistan, which have made it a target of jihadi terrorists.  Reinforcing the 
high level of threat from jihadi terrorism, terrorists attacked the London transit system on 
7 July 2005.  Democratic Spain has faced ETA terrorism since the late 1970s.  Spain also 
maintains a military contingent in Afghanistan and had contributed soldiers to the 
invasion of Iraq.  Terrorists targeted the country on 11 March 2004, killing 192 people 
with bombs on Madrid commuter trains.  Both countries have both long experience with 
counterterrorism and a high level of threat from jihadi terrorism. 
 The United States and Australia were chosen to represent countries with little 
previous experience with counterterrorism.  The United States possesses an entrenched 
liberal democratic government.  The country’s leadership of the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan has particularly inflamed jihadists, but it was a target prior to those conflicts.  
On 11 September 2001, terrorists killed over 3,000 people in the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon.  The nation had little experience with terrorism before then, a familiarity 
generally limited to isolated domestic extremists.  Australia maintains a parliamentary 
democracy patterned along the lines of the United Kingdom.  Its support of and troop 
contributions to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have made it a target of jihadi 
terrorism.  Terrorists struck Australian citizens at a nightclub in Bali in 2002, as well as 
the Australian embassy in Indonesia in 2004.  The country had almost no history of 
exposure to terrorism before the bombings.  The United States and Australia both 
represent nations with little previous counterterrorism experience and high threat level 
from jihadi terrorism. 
 Five different methods were used to analyze the degree to which government 
policies in each of the four countries shifted from away the previous societal equilibrium 
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  Table 1: Summary of data types used to test the hypothesis in each case study 
Type of Data Description 
Internal Governmental 
Scrutiny 
Reports by legislative oversight bodies, independent 
counterterrorism policy reviewers, law reform commission 
Judicial Opinions The opinions of judges in cases relating to counterterrorism 
policy after 9/11 
External Watchdogs Reports on counterterrorism policy by national or 
international human rights or civil liberties organizations 
Media Perception Articles in a range of national and international periodicals 
commenting on counterterrorism 
Academic Assessment Books, book chapters, and articles by scholars on a country’s 
counterterrorism regime 
 
 
 
after 11 September 2001.  Table 1 outlines the types of data examined in this study.  First, 
Internal Governmental Scrutiny referred to reports by legislative oversight bodies, 
independent counterterrorism reviewers, and law reform commissions.  Examples 
included the Joint Committee on Human Rights in the United Kingdom, Lord Carlile in 
the United Kingdom, and the Australian Law Reform Commission.  The second, Judicial 
Opinions, were written judgments of justices in case relating to counterterrorism.  These 
generally came from the highest courts with jurisdiction over terrorism cases in each 
country.  Third, External Watchdogs consisted of reports on counterterrorism policy by 
outside interest groups.  The organizations issuing the papers evaluated in this study were 
both national, like the American Civil Liberties Union, and international, such as Human 
Rights Watch.  Fourth, Media Perception was derived from a sampling of articles on 
counterterrorism from a wide cross-section of periodicals.  The newspapers tended to be 
primarily national, although international papers were included in the initial search, and 
represented a spectrum of political ideologies in the country.  Fifth, the works of scholars 
on counterterrorism were scrutinized in order to find the Academic Assessment.  The 
 21
 
 academics were both national and international, and their findings were taken from 
books, book chapters, and articles in scholarly journals. 
Each method was applied in order to help assess the extent to which the four 
countries’ policies shifted away from approaches based on the previous counterterrorism 
equilibrium.  It was assigned one of the following values to describe the movement: 
significant, moderate, and small.  Table 2 summarizes these values.  The country’s 
change was considered “significant” if there was much greater policy emphasis on 
security, substantial augmentation of governmental counterterrorism powers, and some 
major encroachments on fundamental rights that were enjoyed prior to 11 September 
2001.  This growth could take the form of legislation, extraordinary policing powers, 
revisions of criminal procedure, disruption of normal judicial process, or a combination 
thereof.  A “moderate” shift occurred when there was increased policy emphasis on 
security, some growth of governmental counterterrorism powers, and minor curtailments 
of previous fundamental rights.  A country was said to have made a “small” movement if 
there was slightly more policy emphasis on security, little or no change in governmental 
counterterrorism powers following 11 September 2001, and that those examined 
expressed few fundamental rights concerns.  The values assigned to each method of  
Table 2: Brief description of values assigned to describe the change in 
counterterrorism policy 
Value Description 
Significant Much greater policy emphasis on security, substantial 
augmentation of governmental counterterrorism powers; some 
encroachment on fundamental rights 
Moderate Increased policy emphasis on security, some growth of 
governmental counterterrorism powers; minor fundamental 
rights curtailments 
Small Slightly more policy emphasis on security, little change in 
governmental counterterrorism powers; few fundamental 
rights concerns 
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 examination were then averaged, and a general value was given to the entire post-9/11 
counterterrorism regime of each case.  Table 3 previews the results of each case study. 
The case studies themselves will now be presented.  Part I consists of the two 
countries with extensive previous counterterrorism experience, the United Kingdom and 
Spain.  Part II is the two case studies without extensive previous experience, the United 
States and Australia. 
 
 United 
Kingdom 
Spain United States Australia 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Significant 
 
Small 
 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Table 3: Summary of conclusions by case study 
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 Part I: Extensive Previous Counterterrorism Experience
 
The British Case 
The United Kingdom is a mature liberal democracy with lengthy experience in 
combating an organized, sustained terrorist threat.  The Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
made Britain the number one target in its terror campaign, beginning in the early 1970s.  
Based upon this high level of previous experience with combating terrorism, one would 
expect the United Kingdom to possess a clearly defined, extensively tested, and widely 
accepted counterterrorism regime.  The British developed a sophisticated 
counterterrorism scheme throughout the period, but many of the more extreme provisions 
applied only to Northern Ireland.  The Labour Government under Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, recognizing the changing nature of the terrorist menace to the country, formulated 
the Terrorism Act 2000.  The 2000 Act permanently enshrined and extended the 
provisions of the previous counterterrorism acts designed to primarily counter Northern 
Ireland-related terror to international terrorism.  A number of countries, particularly 
former British possessions, adopted the broad legal definition of terrorism contained 
within the Act (Roach, 2007, p. 228).  The United Kingdom is also at a high risk of 
terrorist attack from jihadi practitioners.  Al Qaeda operatives struck the London 
transport system on 7 July 2005, killing fifty-two and underscoring the deadly 
earnestness of the new threat.  Follow up attacks failed on 21 July 2005, and authorities 
in the United States and the United Kingdom foiled a plot in August 2006 to hijack 
airliners crossing the Atlantic Ocean.  One would expect the United Kingdom, with its 
high level of experience and sophisticated counterterrorism regime, to limit the extent to 
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 which government policy shifted away from the previously established equilibrium 
between security and fundamental rights in responding to terrorism. 
Previous Terrorism Experience 
The United Kingdom faced a sustained thirty-year terrorism campaign born out of 
the centuries-old conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland.  The 
conflict between the different identities, as well as “alleged discrimination of Nationalists 
under the Stormont government (1920-72),” resulted in “a long-running conflict known 
as the Troubles” (Akinyeye, 2005, p. 3).  It exploded into its most violent phase between 
1969 and 1994.  The IRA primarily undertook the campaigns of terrorism in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  The renewed period of violence that lasted from 1969 until the cessation of 
violent activity proclaimed by the IRA in July 2005 was marked by the employ of 
terrorist activity in Britain itself.  Between the years 1969 and 1984, approximately 100 
deaths resulted from terrorist activity in Britain (Walker, 1986, p. 14).  The spread of 
violence from Northern Ireland and the specific targeting of locations and persons in 
Britain had strategic motivation.  It was believed that bloodshed in Britain would have 
more impact than that in Northern Ireland, and that “in a war of attrition, the British 
public [will] tire first” (Bell, 1976, p. 71). 
 Confronted by a situation in which terrorists began attacking urban centers, the 
government responded to increased IRA activity in the early 1970s with “extended 
powers of arrest, search and seizure; widespread detention; increased surveillance 
capabilities; and the creation of a special court to try terrorist suspects” (Donahue, 2003).  
The first dedicated anti-terrorism act was the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act of 1973 (“the 1973 Act”).  It applied only in Northern Ireland, and was designed as a 
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 temporary measure, subject to review and renewal every six months.  The 1973 Act 
provided so-called Diplock courts, which acted without a jury to combat the problem of 
juror intimidation by paramilitaries and gave unique powers to the police and armed 
forces in Northern Ireland to stop, to search and to enter premises.   
 As the violence spread, so, too, did the legislative response of the government of 
the UK.  On Thursday, 21 November 1974, the reality of the terrorism threat facing 
Britain became apparent when twenty-one people were killed in Birmingham.  
Explosions rocked two pubs in the center of the city, injuring a total of 182 people.  The 
Birmingham bombings represented by far the worst incident to have occurred up to that 
point in Britain itself.  Westminster swiftly reacted with the passage of the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (“the 1974 Act”).  
 The 1974 Act codified a number of provisions in order to combat the growing 
threat of terrorism in Britain.  It was directed against Irish nationalist terrorism, and it 
applied to the entirety of the United Kingdom.  Declared “an Act to proscribe 
organisations concerned in terrorism, and to give power to exclude certain persons from 
Great Britain or the United Kingdom in order to prevent acts of terrorism, and for 
connected purposes,” the 1974 Act embraced a variety of harsh measures (Parliament, 
1974).  The Home Secretary himself, introducing the Act on 25 November 1974, warned 
that “the powers…are Draconian.  In combination they are unprecedented in peacetime.  I 
believe they are fully justified to meet the clear and present danger” (Walker, 1986, p. 
22).  The Bill passed by 29 November, with almost no amendment or dissent.   
 The Act introduced a number of new powers to the Government.  Part I of the Act 
referred to proscribed organizations and listing the penalties for aiding and abetting them, 
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 whilst giving the Secretary of State the power to add any organization to the list if he 
deemed it appropriate.  Part II of the 1974 Act awarded the Secretary of State the ability 
to put out an exclusion order, keeping a person from entering the United Kingdom, on 
any person, including citizens.  Part III of the Act extended the powers of a constable to 
arrest and search suspects without a warrant under a reasonable suspicion of engaging in 
the activities described in the previous parts.  Regarding the detention of persons arrested 
under this suspicion, the 1974 Act also provides that “Secretary of State may, in any 
particular case, extend the period of 48 hours by a further period not exceeding 5 days” 
(Parliament, 1974).  Thus, in addition to allowing vast scope for the restriction of 
movement in or out of the United Kingdom by the Government, the Act also extends the 
period a person may be held without charge. 
 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 and the Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 were the primary reactions of the 
Government of the United Kingdom to Irish terrorism.  The supposedly emergency, 
short-term legislation of the 1973 Act was subsequently “was amended in 1976, re-
enacted in 1978, amended again in 1987 and re-enacted once again in 1991” (“Northern 
Ireland,” n.d.).  The non-jury Diplock courts, which were set up under the 1973 Act are 
still in use in Northern Ireland to this day.  The temporary 1974 Act, which applied 
throughout the United Kingdom, was amended in 1976 and 1984 and was re-enacted in 
1989 (“Northern Ireland,” n.d.).  Both remained in use until the passage of the Terrorism 
Act 2000, which had the stated purpose of updating and rationalizing the previous anti-
terrorism Acts.  The two pieces of legislation formed the basic building block for the 
current counterterrorism strategy of the United Kingdom. 
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 Jihadi Terrorism and Response 
Britain, following the Good Friday peace agreements in 1997, decided to revamp 
its counterterrorism regime.  The resulting legislation, the Terrorism Act 2000, reflected 
recognition of the evolution of the major terrorism threat to the United Kingdom from 
Irish irredentist violence to international jihadi terrorism.  It permanently enshrined most 
of the provisions of the previous “temporary” and “emergency” counterterrorism laws.   
Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) intended that the Act would serve as the basis 
for all future British counterterrorism.  The formulators hoped that it would prove 
versatile enough to remove the impetus behind the British tradition of rushing through 
controversial emergency counterterrorism laws.  HMG’s consultation paper published in 
1998 reported the intention of creating “legislation which is both effective and 
proportionate to the threat which the United Kingdom faces from all forms of 
terrorism…which is sufficiently flexible to respond to a changing threat, which ensures 
that individual rights are protected and which fulfils the United Kingdom's international 
commitments” (Home Office, 1998a, para. 8).  Despite significant reservations among 
the respondents to the Home Office consultation paper, the Act was signed into law on 20 
July 2000, came into force on 19 February 2001, and became the basis for the U.K.’s 
counterterrorism regime.6
The United Kingdom passed three major pieces of legislation dedicated solely to 
counterterrorism, with significant portions of other major acts containing provisions 
against terrorism, between September 11, 2001 and January 2008.  Immediately 
following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the government pushed through the Anti-
                                                 
6 For example, of 57 respondents on the proposed new definition of “terrorism,” 28 supported the 
Government’s proposal, 28 possessed significant concerns, and 1 had no comments (Home Office, 1998b). 
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 terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which introduced a wide variety of new 
measures intended to promote public security.  The propensity of the United Kingdom’s 
governing bodies to react with legislation to terrorist violence was shown again in 2005, 
as the government presented the Terrorism Act 2006 in the aftermath of the 7/7 terrorist 
bombings in London. 
The purpose of the Terrorism Act 2000 was to define terrorism and establish a set 
of powers that would be available to authorities in combating violence that fell under that 
definition.  Less than a year after the Act came into force, the government of the United 
Kingdom responded to the events of 9/11 in the United States with the passage of the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.  The Act augments and extends the powers 
of the Terrorism Act 2000.  Its additional powers “concern the investigation and freezing 
of funds which could be used to finance terrorism, the detention and deportation of 
suspected international terrorists, measures designed to enhance the security of the 
nuclear and aviation industries and the extended government control over dangerous 
substances that may be targeted or used by terrorists” (Walter et al, 2004, p. 594).  By far 
the most controversial aspects of the 2001 Act are those regarding deportation and 
asylum seekers.  Non-nationals may be detained indefinitely under the powers afforded 
by this Act on the Home Secretary’s reasonable belief and suspicion that the individual is 
connected to terrorism.   
Her Majesty’s Government soon augmented the 2000 and 2001 Acts with further 
legislation.  With the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the government introduced the 
power to make a “non-derogating” control order over an individual.  A control order 
places obligations upon an individual to prevent, restrict or disrupt involvement in 
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 activity related to terrorism.  The Secretary of State for the Home Office may introduce 
such an order against any person who “he has reasonable grounds for suspecting is 
involved in terrorism-related activity and where he considers it necessary for the 
protection of the public” (Home Office, 2006).  It is a last ditch measure, when 
prosecution is not possible and where it is not possible to deport them if they are a 
foreign national. 
The Terrorism Act 2006, which received royal assent on 30 March 2006, has 
introduced further powers to the government to combat terrorism.  It was made clear that 
the Act was not a direct response to the 7/7 bombings, as new counterterrorism 
legislation had already been planned.  Those security and emergency services that 
responded to the attacks were consulted in the formulation of the law.  The Act made it a 
criminal offence to directly or indirectly encourage the commission, preparation, or 
instigation of acts of terrorism or to disseminate terrorist publications. (Parliament, 2006).  
It extends to statements or publications that glorify terrorism.  Included in the provisions 
of the 2006 Act was an extension of the maximum period for which a suspect terrorist 
could be detained before being charged with an offence from fourteen to twenty-eight 
days (Parliament, 2006). 
Another piece of legislation with important counterterrorism ramifications is the 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which received royal assent on the same 
day as the Terrorism Act 2006, 30 March 2006.  Deportation has always been one of the 
primary tools available to the government to combat terrorism.  The Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 introduced a range of additional measures which are 
relevant in the counter-terrorism context (Home Office, 2006).  The Act allows the 
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 government to “deprive a person of their right of abode (a provision allowing certain 
Commonwealth citizens to enter the UK as if they were British citizens)” (Home Office, 
2006).  Immigration has become an important issue in the United Kingdom, and the 
government increasingly uses the rhetoric of national security to justify the tightening of 
immigration provisions. 
A significant amount of counterterrorism legislation has entered the books in the 
seven years since 11 September 2001.  The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, and the Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 compose the framework within which the British 
conduct their counterterrorism campaign. 
The Acts described above are the main facets of the United Kingdom’s response 
to 11 September 2001.  The extent to which government policy shifted away from the 
previously established equilibrium between security and fundamental rights in 
responding to terrorism after 9/11 is evaluated below using the five methods of testing. 
Internal Governmental Scrutiny 
 The United Kingdom maintains a well-developed system of parliamentary 
oversight and independent policy reviews.  These mechanisms of review and critique 
especially apply to the country’s counterterrorism policies.  Parliamentary bodies such as 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee have issued numerous reports on the operation of the counterterrorism regime 
and its impact on fundamental rights.  Her Majesty’s Government also employs the 
independent reviewer Lord Carlile to issue commentary on the operation of the 
counterterrorism legislation.  It was found that a majority of the reports highlighted a 
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 considerable movement away from fundamental rights toward security in the post-9/11 
counterterrorism strategy of the United Kingdom.7
 The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) has been particularly critical of 
changes in the counterterrorism regime.  The group reported serious reservations about 
the course of policies in all nine of the reports dealing directly with counterterrorism 
issued since 9/11.  In the 2004 Review of Counter-terrorism Powers, the Committee 
questioned the necessity of certain provisions, such as indefinite detention and derogation 
from certain articles of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The JCHR stated 
that the members were convinced that “if the threat from international terrorism is to 
continue for the foreseeable future,” then there needed to be a different method “to deal 
with that threat without derogating indefinitely from important human rights obligations” 
(Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2004, p. 3).  They argued in early 2007 that “there 
should not be exceptions to the rule of law and that certain fundamental principles are 
non-negotiable in the interest of fairness,” referring to the system of control orders 
introduced in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (JCHR, 2007a, p. 3). The JCHR 
found those aspects of the counterterrorism regime that meddled with due process of law 
particularly troublesome.  The use of Special Advocates, who are not informed of even 
the gist of the case against the defendant, to defend a person subject to a control order 
“does not afford the individual the fair hearing, or the substantial measure of procedural 
justice, to which he or she is entitled under both the common law and human rights law” 
(JCHR, 2007b, p. 55).  The Committee insists that counterterrorism measures must stay 
                                                 
7 Of the fifteen reports analyzed by this study, ten cited significant concerns over changes in the 
counterterrorism regime that adversely affected fundamental rights, while five felt that there was some 
movement toward increased security, but that it was constrained and well within constitutional boundaries 
given the nature of the threat. 
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 “within the legal framework provided by…human rights obligations,” and that many 
aspects of the regime violate this basic principle (JCHR, 2006, p. 9).  
 Both the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (HAC) and the 
independent reviewer Lord Carlile also reported a shift toward security in the United 
Kingdom’s counterterrorism policy.  Unlike the rather critical stance taken by the JCHR, 
the three reports issued on the subject by the HAC and the three papers by Lord Carlile 
generally state that the U.K.’s response to terrorism has been proportional, necessary, and 
constitutional.8  The HAC’s (2006) Terrorism Detention Powers identifies that “an 
extension of the maximum period of pre-charge detention, as agreed by Parliament, is 
justified,” in light of the changing nature of the terrorist threat (p. 4).  In its 2001 report, 
the group agrees to the necessity of the most controversial of the immediate provisions 
created in reaction to the 11 September attacks, such as indefinite detention and the 
removal of judicial review in Special Immigration Appeals Commission decisions (HAC, 
2001).  Lord Carlile also approves of the significant movement toward security.  His 
approval is maintained, at least in part, by his belief that “national security is a civil 
liberty, to which every citizen is entitled” (Carlile, 2007, p. 75).  He generally regards the 
counterterrorism regime of the U.K. as “continuing to be fit for purpose” and the 
extension of counterterrorism powers as necessary to preserve security (Carlile, 2007, p. 
75).   
Judicial Opinion 
 The United Kingdom maintains a strong tradition of an independent judiciary.  
Though nominally members of the House of Lords, the Law Lords who makeup the 
                                                 
8 Two reports issued by the Home Affairs Committee questioned the necessity of an extension of powers, 
but did not criticize those already in use (HAC, 2007; HAC, 2001).  
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 highest court of appeal have long been celebrated as the most autonomous facet of the 
British government.  The Law Lords possessed a negligible role in oversight during the 
period of Irish terrorism, but, with the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 into law, 
the role of the judiciary in counterterrorism policy has increased.  In two major decisions, 
one in 2004 and another in 2007, the Law Lords ruled against the Labour Government 
over two of the centerpieces of its counterterrorism regime. 
 The first judgment, issued on 16 December 2004, regarded the detention without 
charge in the United Kingdom of eight foreign nationals.  The appellants challenged that 
their detention violated obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which had been given domestic effect by the Human Rights Act 1998.  In the majority 
opinion, the indefinite detention Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was 
considered “disproportionate and permit[ed] detention of suspected international 
terrorists in a way that discriminate[d] on the ground of nationality or immigration status” 
(UKHL 56, 2004, para. 73).  The Law Lords view the long-term suspension of liberty 
without charge as anathema to a society based upon the rule of law, acceptable only in 
the most exceptional circumstances.  The government, in the court’s opinion, failed to 
prove that the post-9/11 security situation fulfills the requirement of exceptional 
circumstance, by nature of the dissimilar handling of nationals and non-nationals (UKHL 
56, 2004, paras. 74-76).  Lord Hoffman delivered a particularly stinging opinion, arguing 
that the government had overstated the threat to the life of the nation in restricting 
fundamental rights in the United Kingdom.  For him, the true danger to the “life of the 
nation,” a phrase encompassing customary laws and political values, “comes not from 
terrorism, but from laws such as these” (UKHL 56, 2004, para. 97).  In [2004] UKHL 56, 
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 the Law Lords decided, eight to one, that the government had made a significant 
departure from fundamental British rights in its pursuit of security.  While the hunt for 
security was seen as necessary, dutiful and even admirable, the court cautioned the 
government to not stray too far in its search and reproached it for having already done so 
in the case of Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.9
 The Law Lords released a second judgment on the government’s counterterrorism 
policies nearly three years later, on 31 October 2007.  In [2007] UKHL 45, the Appellate 
Committee handed down a complex decision on the control order regime, which replaced 
indefinite detention in 2005.  The Lords permitted the existence of the control order 
regime in general, though they commented that certain portions of the regime constituted 
abuses of the controlled persons’ fundamental rights.  They referenced, for example, that 
one appellant, identified as LL in the document, was allowed only six hours during the 
day to leave his home to visit an extremely restricted number of places.  This, in the 
opinion of Lord Bingham of Cornwall, was the equivalent of “detention in an open 
prison” and constituted a violation of LL’s right to liberty under Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (UKHL 45, 2007, para. 24).  The majority of the 
Lords allowed that control orders could exist, but limited the length of time per day that 
controlled persons could be restricted to their homes.  They decided on the figure of 
sixteen hours, not the eighteen hours that the government argued for, beyond which 
“liberty is lost” (UKHL 45, 2007, para. 108).  The Law Lords determined that, while 
                                                 
9 It is worth noting here that, as a result of this judgment, the government repealed Part 4 of the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 which contained the provisions for indefinite detention of non-
nationals.  It was replaced by “control orders” in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, a regime that has 
proven controversial enough to be the subject of UKHL 45 in 2007, the other House of Lords Judgment 
analyzed in this study. 
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 control orders were acceptable in principle, the government had gone too far in 
application.  
External Watchdogs 
 In addition to the judiciary and internal governmental bodies, the United Kingdom 
faces close scrutiny from a number of external organizations.  Since the attacks on 11 
September, groups such as Amnesty International (Amnesty), Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), and Liberty periodically report on perceived abuses in the counterterrorism 
regimes of countries worldwide.  Their coverage of the United Kingdom reveals 
significant reservations about the consistent widening of counterterrorism powers since 
9/11, and the perception of a significant movement toward security. 
 Each organization has explicitly condemned the counterterrorism regime of the 
country.  Human Rights Watch (2003) offered a scathing assessment of HMG’s record.  
The reaction of the government to the 11 September attacks “resulted in laws, policies, 
and practices that undermine fundamental human rights protections” (p. 20).  They did 
not view this as an isolated incident, but rather felt that “subsequent government action 
and rhetoric signaled a further tendency to opt out of human rights obligations, with little 
effort to find accommodation between national security interests and the protection of 
human rights” (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2003, p. 20).  Liberty, too, identified the 
United Kingdom’s movement away from fundamental rights in counterterrorism policy.  
In its 2004 report Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society: Liberty Response, 
the group admonishes the government to remember that they should be “protecting rather 
than compromising fundamental human rights and rule of law standards” (Liberty, 2004, 
p. 6).  Their website proclaims that many of the counterterrorism policies “undermine the 
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 values that separate us from the terrorist,” as they “have done little to ensure that we are 
safe from terrorist attack, but much to infringe the human rights and civil liberties of 
those living in the UK” (Liberty, 2008a, paras. 2 and 9).  Amnesty International, too, has 
criticized the British counterterrorism regime.  In 2006, the organization reported that 
since 11 September 2001, “the UK authorities have passed a series of new laws, even 
though the UK had some of the toughest ‘anti-terrorism’ laws in Europe” (Amnesty 
International [AI], 2006, p. 4).  They claimed that these laws contained wide provisions 
that have already led to severe human rights abuses. 
 The almost periodic extension of the time limit for a suspect to be held in pre-
charge detention is a major concern for all of these organizations.  As of 1 February 2008, 
the Government of the United Kingdom had introduced a draft terrorism bill into 
Parliament requesting, among other provisions, an extension of the twenty-eight day limit 
on pre-charge detention to fifty-six days.  Liberty has instituted a campaign called 
“Charge or Release,” enlisting celebrities in an attempt to raise awareness to block a 
fourth increase in the upper-limit on pre-charge since 11 September 2001 (Liberty, 
2008b).  Human Rights Watch (2007) is “deeply concerned about the intention of the 
government to extend pre-charge detention beyond the current 28-day limit,” having 
resisted the increase to 28-days in the first place (p. 3).  Amnesty International (2006) 
echoes these feelings, and “remains unreservedly opposed to any extension of the 
maximum time limit for which people detained under anti-terrorism legislation can be 
held without charge” (p. 45).  The organizations consider the current twenty-eight-day 
limit to be more than long enough. Indeed, the United Kingdom’s current limit is four 
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 times longer than that of any other liberal democracy, and fourteen times longer than that 
of the United States (Russell, 2007).   
Media Perception 
 Far more penetrating and pervasive in British society than the relatively few 
dedicated human rights organizations is the media, particularly the newspapers.  The 
power of the press is such that many a British citizen would cite media baron Rupert 
Murdoch’s outspoken support for Tony Blair as one of the main reasons for the Labour 
Party’s landslide victory in 1997.  This large and influential segment of society, true to 
form, has not remained silent on the issue of counterterrorism powers since 11 September 
2001.  A selection of articles from both regional and national newspapers, as well as 
some international papers, on the subject of counterterrorism in the United Kingdom was 
analyzed.10  An overwhelming majority of the articles expressed concern over the major 
policy shift away from the previous counterterrorism equilibrium by the government.11
 The news stories, taken together, form an account of the steady augmentation of 
counterterrorism powers in the United Kingdom.  On 14 December 2001, The Times 
Parliamentary Correspondent reported that “in an antiterrorism Bill rushed forward after 
the attacks on America,” significant new provisions for security were made (Hurst, 
2001).  He also paraphrased the attorney general at the time, Lord Goldsmith, as saying 
that “the Government remained convinced that it was necessary to extend public order 
offences to deal with a rise in hatred offences since the attacks of September 11” (Hurst, 
                                                 
10 The newspapers were accessed on the LexisNexis database and are as follows: The Daily Mail, The 
Independent, The Mail on Sunday, The Evening Standard, The New York Times, The Sunday Herald, The 
International Herald Tribune, The Times, The Sunday Times, The Herald (Glasgow), and The Guardian. 
11 Of thirty-one articles on the U.K.’s counterterrorism analyzed, all identified a significant movement 
toward security, while twenty-five reported what they considered overly repressive policies, three called for 
more repressive measures, and three were neutral. 
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 2001).  A 2002 article reported that “human rights were at risk” because it was “almost 
inevitable that the Government will fail to protect human rights as it tries to combat 
terrorism” (Birmingham Post, 2002, p. 8).  The counterterrorism regime continued to be 
challenged in the media.  The Sunday Herald reported that the “draconian” 
counterterrorism laws derived support from law enforcement due to the fact that “it's not 
so hard to put someone behind bars if evidence against them cannot be challenged” 
(Mackay, 2004, p. 13).  Some news items identify both an expansion in counterterrorism 
powers and ineffectiveness.  A 2004 article stated that “not only do all the new 
[counterterrorism] measures smack of an authoritarianism alien to our traditions; they 
won't work” (Wilson, 2004, p. 15).  Another reported that, although “vast resources have 
been spent on counterterrorism since the attacks of September 11, 2001,” a leaked policy 
paper acknowledged that “the government’s counterterrorism strategy is failing” 
(Leppard, 2005, p. 2).
Academic Assessment 
 The counterterrorism regime of the United Kingdom maintains the interest of 
academics, as well as the media.  A variety of scholars researched the country’s responses 
to Irish terrorism, and a few, such as Conor Gearty and Clive Walker, continued their 
investigations following 11 September 2001.  The general view among academics is of a 
significant repositioning of the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism policy toward 
security, often to the detriment of the respect for fundamental rights previously enjoyed 
in the country. 
 Those scholars who researched the earlier struggle with Irish terrorism have not 
been shy in reacting to the current counterterrorism environment in the United Kingdom.  
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 Clive Walker, a lecturer and researcher at the University of Leeds who wrote extensively 
on emergency legislation in the context of Irish terrorism, identified intelligence reform 
as a necessity to preserve human rights while fulfilling security requirements.  Since 11 
September 2001, “the experience of exclusion and detention without trial”  that, “at least 
in the context of executive orders based on intelligence, further regulation is desirable” 
(Walker, 2005, p. 410).  Conor Gearty, director of the Centre for the Study of Human 
Rights and professor of law at the London School of Economics, has published 
prolifically on the human rights impact of the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism 
regime.  He describes a march toward security, but with constitutional concerns slowing 
and even, in a few isolated incidents, reversing that movement.  In a 2006 lecture, he 
identified the drift toward “administrative powers rooted in executive judgments about 
involvement in terrorism (very broadly defined) being used against individuals and 
groups without the safeguards that would be regarded as normal if the criminal justice 
model were being followed” (Gearty, 2003, p. 8).  The human rights framework of the 
United Kingdom, for the most part, made room for these “security-oriented changes,” 
achieving a certain level of compliance with, rather than hostility toward human rights in 
doing so (Gearty, 2003, p. 8-9).  The counterterrorism regime ushered in following 11 
September 2001 challenged the commitment to legality of the British state.  The 
condition that “all state actions be justified by law and that the punishment of individuals 
for wrongs done should only follow an independent process of adjudication” is being 
undermined (Gearty, 2007, p. 358). 
 Other scholars have expressed concerns about aspects of the United Kingdom’s 
counterterrorism regime.  Kent Roach, professor of law at the University of Toronto, 
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 highlighted the expansive definition of terrorism operating the UK as well as the 
tendency to build upon this definition in post-9/11 legislation (Roach, 2007, pp. 242-
249).  Lucia Zedner, Professor in Criminal Justice and Fellow of Corpus Christi College 
at the University of Oxford, questions the system of control orders (Zedner, 2007, pp. 
263-264), especially as such restrictive measures were not viewed as necessary in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11 (Fenwick, 2002; Lowe, 2005; Walker, 2004; Zedner, 2005).  
Academics identify what appears to them to be a considerable and inexorable movement 
that favors security in the British response to jihadi terrorism.   
Conclusion 
 The United Kingdom has a long and complex history of combating terrorism.  As 
the most prominent of the United States’ allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the country has 
found itself facing a high threat of jihadi terror.  One might expect that the United 
Kingdom’s previous experience combating domestic terrorism would prepare it well to 
face the menace of jihadi terrorism.  Indeed, the United Kingdom possessed one of the 
most advanced and sophisticated counterterrorism framework among liberal democracies 
as of 11 September 2001.  With this experience cataloged and this counterterrorism 
structure in place, it was expected that the UK would report a very limited response to the 
9/11 attacks.  Yet an evaluation of data collected from a variety of sources—internal 
governmental oversight, judicial opinion, external watchdogs, the media, and 
academics—suggested that the British government pursued policies that marked a 
significant deviation from the previous counterterrorism equilibrium of 11 September 
2001.   
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 The Spanish Case 
 Spain is a young liberal democracy with a long history of combating terrorism.  
Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) conducted over thirty years of violent operations against 
the Spanish state, first that of General Francisco Franco and later the democratic 
government establish by the 1978 Constitution.  One would anticipate, due to this 
extensive experience with previous terrorism, that the Spanish state possessed a far-
reaching, thoroughly examined counterterrorism regime that required little change in 
order to face the threat of jihadi terrorism.  And indeed, the Spanish state does have a 
sophisticated counterterrorism policy based upon their experience with the ETA menace.  
The country eschews specific counterterrorism legislation, relying instead upon the 
treatment of terrorism as an aggravated crime.  This approach is enshrined in the special 
provisions of the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure which apply only to those 
suspected of involvement in terrorism.  Responsibility for defining terrorism has fallen to 
the powerful Spanish judiciary.  The Constitutional Court has developed a broad 
definition of terrorism based upon numerous judgments, almost entirely relating to ETA-
related proceedings (Soria, 2004, p. 518).   
Spain is also at a high risk from jihadi terrorism.  On 11 March 2004, jihadi 
terrorists loosely affiliated with Al Qaeda attacked the Madrid commuter train system, 
killing 191 and wounding over 1,800.  Although this triggered a major change in 
Madrid’s foreign policy, scholars maintain that the risk to Spain from jihadi terrorism 
remains high (Jordán, 2005, pp. 79, 108-111).  One would thus expect Spain, with its 
long history of combating ETA terrorism, to have made at most a small policy shift away 
from the previous counterterrorism equilibrium on 11 September 2001 toward security.   
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 Previous Terrorism Experience 
 Spain has struggled with a sustained terrorism campaign for over thirty-years.  
ETA is a violent manifestation of the desire for self-rule in the Basque region of northern 
Spain.  The transition period from authoritarian state to democracy marked the greatest 
increase in ETA violence.  The group, along with a few other violent political 
organizations, caused close to 400 fatalities in the transition period between 1976 and 
1980, at a rate of about seventy-five deaths per year (Reinares, 2000, p. 120).  Since 
1968, when the organization began using violence, ETA has been responsible for 821 
fatalities (Ministry of the Interior, 2007).    
The Constitution of 1978 recognized the presence of a terrorist threat to the state, 
although the only reference to terrorism in the Constitution of 1978 can be seen in 
Chapter V, Article 55.  While the article mentions terrorist elements (elementos 
terroristas), it fails to define exactly what is encompassed under “terrorism” (Boletín 
Oficial del Estado [BOE], 1978).  The Article does provide for conditions under which 
the rights granted in earlier sections of the Constitution might be suspended.  Article 
55(1) states that “the rights recognized in Articles 17, 18(2) and (3), 19, 20(1)(a) and (d) 
and (5), 21, 28(2), and Article 37(2) may be suspended when a state of emergency or 
siege is declared” (ICL, 1978).  This gives the government the ability to violate 
fundamental liberties in the event of a state of emergency.  Article 55(2) is directly 
concerned with the threat of terrorism.  It asserts that “an organic law may determine the 
manner and the cases in which…the rights recognized in Article 17(2) and 18(2) and (3) 
may be suspended for certain persons with respect to investigations having to do with the 
activities of armed bands or terrorist elements” (ICL, 1978).  Essentially, Article 55(2) 
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 allows the government to suspend the fundamental liberties of an individual, if that 
person is suspected of engagement with a terrorist organization.  The provisions of Title 
V, Article 116 limit the abuse of those in Article 55 by strictly outlining the proper 
procedure for and duration of states of emergency and siege.  Neither may exceed thirty 
days, though it may be extended after a review by the Spanish government (ICL, 1978). 
One of the first, shortest-lived and most controversial of the Spanish 
government’s long term strategies to counter ETA terrorism was the GAL.  The 
Antiterrorist Liberation Groups (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación) embodied the 
“Dirty War Strategy.”12  The group conducted paramilitary operations, primarily 
assassinations, on both sides of the border between Spain and France.  Twenty-seven 
people fell victim to the GAL between 1983 and 1987, ten of whom had no connection to 
ETA.13  Yet the GAL was no ordinary terrorist group.  The killing stopped after it was 
uncovered that “the GAL was an extralegal group, certainly started by the Spanish 
government itself” (Shepherd, 2002, p. 60).
The long-term Spanish counterterrorism strategy to combat ETA consists of four 
primary elements: a penitentiary policy, including reinsertion programs, more self-
government and the national and international isolation of ETA.14  The penitentiary 
policy was intended to wipe out group cohesiveness and, in so doing, persuade prisoners 
to defect and accept social reinsertion.  Social reinsertion is backed by Article 579 of the 
Penal Code, which gives courts the ability to reduce the sentence for any crimes of 
                                                 
12 For a respected English language study of the organization, see Woodworth, 2001.  In Spanish see 
Cerdán & Rubio, 1997. 
13 For a chronology of the GAL’s attacks, see Woodworth, 2001, p. 434. 
14 For an excellent discussion of the four strategies, see Soria, 2004, pp. 526-32. 
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 terrorism, provided the terrorists voluntarily assist authorities to stop new crimes (Soria, 
2004, 528).   
The second facet of the Spanish government’s strategy has been self-government 
for the Basque country.    The division of Spain into constituent regions is enshrined in 
the Constitution of 1978, with the competencies of both the “autonomous communities” 
and the “state” enumerated in Articles 148 and 149 (ICL, 1978).  After the adoption of 
the 1978 Constitution, the Basque country, along with Catalonia, acquired extensive 
autonomy rights.  The Statute of Autonomy of Euskadi (Estatuto de Autonomía del País 
Vasco), Organic Law No. 3/1979, was approved on 18 December 1979, and established 
the “Basque Country” as “an expression of [Basque] nationality” (Boletín Oficial del 
Estado, 1979).  In so doing, the government wiped out much of the social support ETA 
had enjoyed during the Franco years.  While an effective counter for ETA terrorism, there 
is no likely parallel in the case of jihadi terrorism. 
Attempts to isolate ETA from its national base of support have represented the 
third pillar of the long-term strategy to fight terrorism.  The participation of both the 
Partido Popular and the Partido Socialista Obrera Española, the two major Spanish 
political parties, in the Pact of Madrid (5 November 1987), the Pact of Ajuria Enea (12 
January 1988), and the Pact of Navarra (7 October 1988) signified a rejection of 
politically motivated violence and a reiteration of the principle of no political negotiation 
with terrorists.15  The documents do leave the option open to a negotiated end to 
violence.  In the most recent Agreement in Favor of Liberty and Against Terrorism (12 
December 2000), the Popular Party (Partido Popular) and the Spanish Socialist Party 
                                                 
15 The text (in Spanish) of the three pacts are available on the Civil Guard website: 
http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/documentos/pactos.jsp.  
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 (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) reinforced their unity against terrorism, denounced 
ETA’s violence and described ETA as “a problem of the State” (“Acuerdo por las 
libertades,” 2000).  Both the Spanish government and the Basque autonomous 
government have attempted to isolate the political manifestations of ETA. 
 The fourth and final mainstay of the long-term strategy to combat ETA has been 
the pursuit of international isolation.  The government has proven the presence of ETA in 
several close countries, like France and Germany, as well as in Belgium, Mexico, 
Venezuela or Uruguay (Soria, 2004, p. 531).  The biggest obstructionists in Europe were 
forced to concede and assist Spanish counterterrorism efforts.  The Presidency of the 
European Union in 2002 allowed Spain to focus on security, especially counterterrorism.  
In this endeavor, the “greatest success of Spain’s policy was the elaboration of an EU 
Common Position on a list of international terrorist groups, which includes ETA and the 
political party Batasuna” (Soria, 2004, p. 532).   
Jihadi Terrorism and Response 
Unlike many nations in the world, such as the United Kingdom and France, Spain 
does not have specific antiterrorism laws, before or since 9/11.  Terrorism is treated as an 
intensified form of crime.  Terrorist crimes “are now included in the regular Criminal 
Code and special law enforcement and judicial powers to combat terrorism are 
incorporated into the Criminal Code of Procedure” (HRW, 2005, p. 14).  In addition to 
not possessing particular antiterrorism legislation, another striking feature of Spain’s 
counterterrorism regime is the complete lack of differentiation “between national and 
international terrorism” (Soria, 2004, p. 534).  Only in the competencies of the police 
forces is there any measure of demarcation: regional authorities have jurisdiction over 
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 regional terrorist activity, while the national police body (Cuerpo Nacional de Policia) or 
the Guardia Civil handle the combating of national or international terrorism. 
 The legal response of the Spanish government to terrorism is primarily 
represented by the broad range of criminal offences which provide protection from 
terrorism.  Most of these offences are contained in Articles 571-580 of the Spanish Penal 
Code (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1995).  They are specifically defined and are subject to 
harsher punishments than similar offences committed without terrorist purposes.  
The Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal) is 
another important facet to the Spanish counterterrorism regime.  While there does not 
exist a specific criminal procedure for trials of suspected terrorists, the legal system 
“contains particular material provisions that may be applied when prosecuting and trying 
terrorist offences” (Gómez-Céspedes & Domínguez, 2006, p. 27).  One of the most 
widely used and most controversial provisions is that of preventive detention.  The 
normal deadline to be held in custody without charge, as established in Article 17 of the 
Constitution of 1978, is seventy-two hours.  In cases of persons detained under suspicion 
of participation in a crime perpetrated by a terrorist organization, preventative detention 
maybe extended by a court ruling for another forty-eight hours, bringing the total time of 
detention to five days.  A judge may also render a suspect incommunicado, which can be 
extended for a total of up to thirteen days, though it may not, under any circumstances, be 
extended past this time frame (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2003).   
Incommunicado detention is a severe situation that infringes upon the ordinary 
rights of a Spanish citizen.  It consists of a number of conditions.  The detainee has the 
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 right to an assigned counsel, not one of their choice.16  Once a statement or identity has 
been recorded by the authorities, the accused loses his or her access to an attorney.  The 
suspect has the right to be examined by a court-appointed physician while 
communication between the detainee and his next of kin is delayed.  Oral communication 
by the detainee is not allowed, and all written communications are seized by a magistrate.  
The procedure governing incommunicado detention was modified most recently in 
November 2003 in Organic Law 15/2003, which allows a detainee to request a medical 
examination from a second physician (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2003b).  The law also 
gives judges the authority to order a suspect to be placed back in incommunicado 
detention for a period of up to three days, even after they have been reentered into 
communication (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2003b).  Incommunicado detention has 
proven the most controversial facet of Spain’s counterterrorism regime. 
 Other provisions are unique to terrorism, but are less controversial than 
incommunicado detention.  One of these is entry into and search of private dwellings.  
Under normal circumstances, the owner must give his or her consent, there must be an 
expressly motivated court ruling, or the crime must be occurring at the time in order for 
the authorities to be able to enter a premises.  Article 533 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure makes special provision for times when the persons concerned are suspected of 
terrorist activity (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1882).  Authorities are allowed to enter 
without a previously acquired warrant and investigate, as long as they contact a judge 
immediately following the action.  Article 579(4) grants the authority to authorize the 
interception of communications for a period of up to seventy-two hours to the Minister of 
                                                 
16 The discussion of Incommunicado detention maybe found in Gómez-Céspedes and Domínguez, 2006, p. 
27. 
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 the Interior or the Secretary of State for Security if the procedure aims to uncover the 
activities of terrorists (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 1882).  Combined with incommunicado 
detention, these provisions are potent tools to combat terrorism. 
Spain does not rely upon emergency legislation as a main component of its 
antiterrorism regime.  Article 55(2) of the Spanish Constitution, as discussed above, 
allows for special Organic Laws to be passed during a time of crisis or emergency with 
the ability to suspend certain rights enumerated in the document (ICL, 1978).  No 
comparable emergency legislation exists in Spain, despite this power.  Most special 
provisions in the fight against terrorism are contained within the Penal Code or the Code 
of Criminal Procedure.  These stipulations are considered “concrete-individual 
emergency legislation,” as they are rarely used due to the narrow judicial interpretation of 
the conditions necessary for an “emergency” to be present (Soria, 2004, pp. 549-550).  
The legislative response to 11 September 2001 and to the devastating Al Queda 
attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid has proven moderate.  The government of Spain has 
seen little need for further legislation in order to combat the threat.  As recently as 
January 2008, only two laws wholly concerned with terrorist activity have been passed.  
The first is Law No. 12/2003, on the prevention and freezing of terrorist financing 
(Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2003c).  The law allows the government to freeze any 
financial flow or account in prevention of terrorist activity.  It also grants the right to 
verify the true nature of the funds, of their origin and of the identity of the person 
responsible for the transactions (Gómez-Céspedes & Domínguez, 2006, p. 49).  The 
second law is Organic Law No. 4/2005, regarding serious crimes caused by explosives 
(Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2005).  This law was a direct result of 11 March 2004 and the 
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 ruinous consequences of failures to control the storage of explosives.  It provides stricter 
penalties both for the illegal possession of explosives and the failure of those responsible 
to safeguard it (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2005).  The two laws represent a moderate 
legislative response to a devastating terrorist attack. 
The laws and codes described above are the main facets of Spain’s 
counterterrorism policy since 11 September 2001.  The extent to which these provisions 
and the counterterrorism regime as a whole marked a policy shift away from the previous 
counterterrorism equilibrium is evaluated below using the five methods of testing. 
Internal Governmental Scrutiny 
 No in-depth internal governmental scrutiny of post-9/11 Spanish counterterrorism 
policy was available to the public at the time of this study.  Brief mentions of specific 
facets of the government’s policy toward terrorism were found in the annual 
Ombudsman’s reports.  The “Defender of the People,” as the Ombudsman is officially 
known, exists to protect the rights and liberties of citizens from abuses by functionaries 
of the state.  He or she only investigates specific complaints, however, rather than 
undertaking extensive oversight inquiries.  For example, some suggestions were made in 
the 2004 report to help the Spanish government avoid racism in counterterrorism 
(Defensor del Pueblo, 2005, p. 580-584).  In the same report, a few measures were 
suggested regarding the government’s treatment of the victims of terrorism (Defensor del 
Pueblo, 2005, pp. 289-295).  Yet no oversight reports, such as those issued by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights in the United Kingdom or the various Congressional 
Committees in the United States, were available for Spain. 
Judicial Opinions 
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  Spain has an inquisitorial civil law system, which is unique among the countries 
examined in this study.  All terrorism cases are referred to the jurisdiction of the 
Audiencia Nacional in Madrid, overseen by an official with the dual responsibilities of 
judge and investigator.  The Audiencia maintains unique security features, the personnel 
are experienced in terrorist cases, and it has developed particular jurisprudence in 
terrorism proceedings.  This jurisdiction was established in 1977 in response to the ETA 
menace, but, as Spain makes no distinction between national and international terrorism, 
the court has found itself responsible for jihadi terror cases as well.  The judiciary, in the 
decision analyzed below, exhibited a belief that the counterterrorism framework that 
existed prior to 9/11 could effectively be applied to jihadi terrorism. 
The trial of the twenty-nine jihadi terrorism suspects charged with aiding in the 
preparation and execution of the 11 March 2004 bombings in Madrid is the most 
important counterterrorism case heard since 9/11 by the Audiencia Nacional.  On 11 
April 2006, after two years of investigation, Juan del Olmo charged twenty-nine suspects 
with various offences pertaining to the 11 March bombings (Mercado, 2006).  In a 1,471 
page document, Olmo detailed the evidence and the case against each of the accused.  
Hundreds of pages documented electronic intercepts, mobile phone surveillance, 
interrogations, and transcripts of meetings between suspects and the deceased 
perpetrators (Audiencia Nacional, 2006).  The judge used various laws and previous 
judgments in Spanish counterterrorism cases, dating from the early 1980s, in order to 
justify charging the twenty-nine people with terrorism-related crimes (Audiencia 
Nacional, 2006, pp. 1411-1428).  He consciously applied the existing counterterrorism 
regime to jihadi terrorism.  Olmo also wrote that in order to undertake “adequate criminal 
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 prosecution,” one should understand the jihadi philosophy behind the violence 
(Audiencia Nacional, 2006, p. 1428).  The Decree (Auto) set the stage for the later 
prosecution of the suspects. 
 The Audiencia Nacional announced judgment on the twenty-nine suspects on 31 
October 2007.  The majority were found guilty of membership in a terrorist organization, 
and sentenced to various prison sentences.  The judges wrote in their decision that the 
defendants “are members of terrorist cells and groups of the jihadi type…that, through 
the use of violence in all of its manifestations, seek to overturn democratic regimes and 
eliminate the Western Christian cultural tradition” (Audiencia Nacional, 2007, pp. 172-
173).  The decisions disappointed many observers, as they delivered only three murder 
verdicts out of the twenty-nine defendants.  For example, an American lawyer, resident in 
Madrid during the bombings, commented on the rulings, stating that they were not 
promising in terms of the prospects for prosecuting jihadi terrorists worldwide 
(Anderson, 2007, p. 1).  In his opinion, the current Spanish criminal justice system, 
directly adapted from ETA terrorism, was “not necessarily capable either of ensuring 
public safety or even of doing justice in serious terrorism cases” (Anderson, 2007, p. 2).  
Yet despite this outside criticism, the general perception among the judiciary, as 
represented by their treatment of the 11 March case, was that little in the counterterrorism 
regime has changed since 9/11, and nothing really needed to.   
External Watchdogs 
 Spain has also found its counterterrorism regime under examination by external 
watchdog organizations.  Organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights have all issued 
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 reports on Spanish policies to combat terrorism, especially since 11 September 2001.  
Their treatment of the Spanish counterterrorism regime highlights little movement from 
pre-9/11 practices, but some express distaste over policies used to counter ETA being 
extended to jihadi terrorism without addressing underlying fundamental rights concerns. 
 Each organization identified only a small shift from the pre-9/11 equilibrium, 
emphasizing the application of previously existing powers to the new threat.  Amnesty 
International wrote two reports on facets of Spanish counterterrorism since 11 September 
2001.  In a 2002 paper, the group strongly condemned the practice of incommunicado 
detention.  The criticism was the repetition of one that had been made by AI in June 
1999, however, when incommunicado detention was extended by an additional forty-
eight hours for terrorism suspects (AI, 2002, p. 7).  AI also mentioned incommunicado 
detention in a report on European Union-wide counterterrorism policies.  It again 
repeated its desire that the procedure be reformed or abrogated, but noted once more that 
these were concerns dating well prior to 11 September 2001 (AI, 2005, section 3.3.2).   
The Human Rights Watch (2005) report on counterterrorism measures in Spain 
was the most extensive examination since 11 September 2001.  The organization wrote 
that “Spain’s extensive [counterterrorism] provisions, though developed in response to 
internal violence, placed that country at the forefront of international [counterterrorism] 
efforts in the wake of the September 11 attacks” (HRW, 2005, p. 15).  The group also 
highlighted the fact that Spain did not tend to develop further policies in response to 
perceived threats.  Though the country experimented with specific counterterrorism 
legislation in the past, “terrorist crimes” are “included in the regular Criminal Code and 
special law enforcement and judicial powers to combat terrorism are incorporated into the 
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 Criminal Code of Procedure” since the early 1990s (HRW, 2005, p. 14).  Even following 
the 11 March 2004 jihadi terrorist attacks on the country, the government did “not 
envision making any changes to Spain’s existing [counterterrorism] measures” (HRW, 
2005, p. 8). 
 Other organizations have identified a similarly small movement from previous 
policy after 11 September 2001.  Alvaro Gil-Robles (2005), the Council of Europe’s 
Commissioner for Human Rights, visited Spain from the 10 through 19 March 2005.  The 
Commissioner, even though he recorded a few specific instances of abuse, described a 
situation of general respect for human rights that had not changed over time.  In his 
report, Mr. Gil-Robles wrote that: 
In spite of the persistent and violent terrorist attacks Spain has suffered 
since its transition to democracy nearly 30 years ago, and in spite of the 
dramatic escalation in the violence of terrorist attacks in general, visible in 
the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Madrid attacks of 11 March 2004 
and the more recent events in London in July 2005, there has been no 
corresponding toughening of the legislation to curtail, restrict or limit the 
rights of people detained for terrorist activities. Nor has any exceptional 
legislation been introduced. (Gil-Robles, 2005, para. 7).  
The above quotation sums up the universal recognition found in the external watchdogs’ 
reports of only a small policy shift away from the previous counterterrorism equilibrium 
since 11 September 2001. 
Media Perception 
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  Counterterrorism receives extensive media coverage in Spain.  Perhaps reflecting 
the perceived level of threat in society, stories relating to ETA tend to be significantly 
more numerous than those dealing with jihadi terrorism.  Despite this tendency, a number 
of articles on general counterterrorism and combating jihadi terrorism were examined for 
this study.17  All articles scrutinized recognized only a small movement toward security, 
while they were closely split on whether the counterterrorism policies created some 
fundamental rights concerns.18
 The limited change in Spain’s counterterrorism policy following the events of 
9/11 is a consistent theme in periodicals.  In an opinion piece in El Pais, Communist 
Party leader Santiago Carrillo traced the development of the jihadi terror threat in a 
country that had long experience with ETA terrorism (pp. 15-16).  He argued that, despite 
the fact that, in his opinion, jihadi terrorism represented the greatest threat to Spain, the 
policies used to counter it remained essentially the same as those used to combat ETA 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Carrillo, 2007, p. 16).  An El Mundo piece attributed the 
success of Spanish counterterrorism efforts in 2002 to the “legal and judicial” provisions 
“initiated years ago” that “had begun to bear fruit” (Escriva, 2002, pp. 8-9).19  In a 2007 
article, the paper 20minutos quoted a motion to have terrorism charges dropped against a 
young man which highlighted the long pedigree of the Spanish counterterrorism regime.  
The power of the Audiencia Nacional to decree provisional incarceration for suspected 
members of a terrorist organization was traced by the legal team to the Tribunal of Public 
                                                 
17 The articles were accessed using either the LexisNexis Academic database or the search feature on the 
periodicals’ websites.  They came from the following newspapers: El Pais, Expansion (Madrid), El Mundo, 
20 Minutos, and the International Herald Tribune. 
18 Of thirty articles evaluated, twelve felt that the policies were too repressive, thirteen wrote that the 
counterterrorism regime was either too liberal or had justified fundamental rights restrictions, while five 
were neutral. 
19 “El acoso legal y judicial iniciado hace años ha comenzado a dar sus frutos.” 
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 Order under the dictator Francisco Franco (Europa Press, 2007).  A 2001 article in El 
Mundo described the process of modifying the law in Spain to make it easier to freeze the 
assets of jihadi terrorists.  Despite the fact that the “counterterrorism legislation in Spain 
is very advanced,” the United Nations and the Spanish government felt it was necessary 
to tighten legislation regarding disrupting the financing of terrorism (Europa Press, 
2001).20
 To be sure, some articles did question whether the Spanish counterterrorism 
regime was equipped to confront the jihadi terrorism threat.  Victoria Burnett (2007) 
reported on the surprise acquittal of suspected jihadi terrorists and the difficulty of 
convicting international terrorists.  She quoted one counterterrorism expert as saying that 
“it is a point of pride to be able to try people in a courtroom, with full constitutional 
guarantees…but in Spain there is space for debate about whether we need to adapt our 
judicial legislation and culture to confront international Islamist terrorism” (Burnett, 
2007, p. 1).  Yet, in a 2002 article in El Mundo, the Spanish defense minister compared 
the Spanish experience with terrorism to the new jihadi terror threat at a European-wide 
security conference in Munich.  At the meeting, the minister stated that Spain “will 
continue fighting against terrorism with the following principles: full respect for the law, 
the functioning of the legislative system and security forces, maximum social support and 
mobilization, and maximum international cooperation” (EFE, 2002).21  His words echoed 
the general sense in the media: the Spanish counterterrorism regime had undergone little 
modification in order to combat the jihadi threat and did not need to change. 
                                                 
20 “La legislación antiterrorista en España está ya muy avanzada.”
21 “seguirá luchando contra el terrorismo con los siguientes principios: pleno respeto de la ley, 
funcionamiento del sistema legislativo y de las fuerzas de seguridad, máximo apoyo y movilización social 
y máxima cooperación internacional.”
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 Academic Assessment 
 Scholars have studied different dimensions of counterterrorism in Spain since the 
ETA campaigns of the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Their inspection did not cease with 
the advent of the jihadi terror threat.  The scholars have overwhelmingly identified a 
restrained response to both 9/11 and the 11 March 2004 bombings in Madrid.  While 
some have questioned whether new measures are needed to combat the new threat, the 
general consensus has been of a perception amongst policymakers that the existing 
counterterrorism framework in the country was sufficient. 
 Many commentators have explicitly written of Spain’s lack of movement toward 
policy based on greater emphasis on security in the aftermath of 11 September 2001.  
José Martínez Soria (2004) observed that “unlike other states, Spain has so far not 
enacted any anti-terror legislation after September 11th” (p. 521).  Indeed, he argued, 
“there was no need to do so because of the existing Spanish anti-terror legislation 
triggered by the Basque terrorism” (Soria, 2004, p. 521).  This conviction that the 
framework used to combat ETA terrorism was adequate to face the new jihadi terrorism, 
expressed by Soria, is a recurring theme in the literature about Spanish counterterrorism.  
Salvador Martí, Pilar Domingo, and Pedro Ibarra (2007) traced the development of 
counterterrorism policies in Spain, identifying little alteration following 11 September 
2001 from previous practice.  They wrote that “as regards existing antiterrorist 
legislation, there has been no significant change in law” (Martí, Domingo, & Ibarra, 
2007, p. 134).  Kristin Archik, Carl Ek, Paul Gallis, Francis T. Miko, and Steven Woehrel 
(2006), writing for the U.S. Congressional Research Service, also identified the lack of 
major change in the Spanish counterterrorism regime since 11 September 2001.  They 
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 noted that “Spain, unlike the United States, has rejected a wholesale reorganization of its 
homeland security institutions” largely due to the “decades-long struggle with the Basque 
terrorist movement Eta [sic]” (Archik, Ek, Gallis, Miko, & Woehrel, 2006, p. 32).   
Some investigators have been critical of the limited Spanish response.  Case 
Western Reserve University law professor and twenty-year veteran of the Israeli Defense 
Force Amos N. Guiora studied the post-9/11 responses of various countries.  He wrote 
that since March 2004, “Spain has not enacted special or emergency legislation,” despite 
evidence that such action might prove necessary (Guiora, 2005, p. 47).  He highlighted 
that “rather than implementing numerous measures intended to provide the law 
enforcement community additional powers or undertaking vigorous policy initiatives,” 
the government did little “in response both to 9/11 and March 2004” (Guiora, 2005, pp. 
47-48).  Guiora emphasized a belief amongst policymakers in the adequacy of the 
existing legislation as the primary reason little was done following the attacks.  Enrique 
Álvarez Conde and Hortensia González (2006) prepared a report for the Real Instituto El 
Cano, a Spanish think tank, comparing responses to 9/11.  Referring to Spain in their 
conclusion, they wrote that the much of the country’s counterterrorism legislation had 
been declared unconstitutional in the 1980s and 1990s, so there was little impetus to try 
to enact new legislation following 9/11 (Conde & González, 2006, pp. 9-10).   
In sum, whether praising or criticizing Madrid’s response, all of these scholars 
share the view that Spain had little shift toward greater security in its counterterrorism 
policy since 11 September 2001. 
Conclusion 
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  Spain has extensive past experience combating terrorism.  The country faces a 
high threat of jihadi terror as a former participant in the war in Iraq and a current troop 
contributor to Afghanistan.  Based upon the hypothesis presented earlier in the study, one 
would suppose that Spain’s previous experience combating domestic terrorism would 
have resulted in a set of policy instruments that were equipped to face the menace of 
jihadi terrorism.  Spain possessed a sophisticated counterterrorism framework prior to 11 
September 2001.  With its experience and a broad counterterrorism structure in place, it 
was expected that the country would report a constrained response to the 9/11 attacks.  
Evaluating data collected from a variety of sources—including judicial opinion, external 
watchdogs, the media, and academics—suggested that Spain did indeed limit their 
response to 11 September 2001, making a small deviation from the counterterrorism 
equilibrium. 
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 Part II: Little Previous Counterterrorism Experience
 
The American Case 
The United States of America is one of the oldest and most stable liberal 
democracies in the world.  The threat of wide-scale terrorist activity is new to the 
country.  The U.S. lacks experience countering sustained terrorist violence; because of 
this, it had a limited counterterrorism framework prior to 11 September 2001.  On that 
date, jihadi terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C., killing over 3,000 people.  The events of 9/11 triggered a wide-
ranging response, including new dedicated counterterrorism legislation and military 
action.  The U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have made the country a 
lightning rod for jihadists around the globe.  Terrorist attacks on allies, such as Spain in 
2004 and the United Kingdom in 2005 have reinforced the high threat perception among 
policymakers in the U.S.  The government of the United States has reacted to the new 
menace with increased counterterrorism powers.  One would expect the United States, 
with its limited counterterrorism experience, to make a significant policy shift away from 
the previous counterterrorism equilibrium. 
Previous Terrorism Experience 
 Until 11 September 2001, terrorism was primarily an international and foreign 
policy problem for the United States, and one which did not seem to pose a large threat 
(Norwitz, 2002; Perl, 2003, p. 2).  This is not to say that the U.S. was never a target of 
terrorist violence.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that between 1980 
and 1999, there were 327 acts or suspected acts of terrorism in the United States, of 
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 which 239 were labeled domestic and eighty-eight international (FBI, 1999, p. 16).  The 
327 attacks resulted in 205 persons killed and 2,037 persons injured, though just two 
incidents (the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) 
were responsible for 85 percent of the deaths and at least 80 percent of the injuries (FBI, 
1999, p. 16).  These figures need to be placed within the larger milieu of global terrorism.  
According to figures provided by the U.S. Department of State, 14,000 international 
terrorist incidents occurred between 1968 and 1999, resulting in over 10,000 deaths 
(Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 1999).  The comparative familiarity of 
other countries, including some other liberal democracies, with terrorism on their soil is 
also an important context.  The United Kingdom recorded over 3,000 fatalities between 
1969 and 1999 in its struggle with the IRA, while Spain suffered 771 deaths in attacks by 
ETA between 1968 and 1999 (Ministry of the Interior, 2007).  In light of the experience 
of these other countries, the U.S. possessed a limited occurrence of terrorism prior to 11 
September 2001. 
Jihadi Terrorism and Response 
 The United States experience with terrorism was limited before 9/11.  The 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and 
the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 represented salvoes aimed at the United 
States by jihadi terrorists (McFadden, 2007).  Yet only the events of 11 September 2001 
truly underscored the fact that the threat of jihadi terrorism to the U.S. was a clearer and 
more present danger to the country than previously thought possible.  The attacks spurred 
major changes in the nation’s counterterrorism regime, adjustments that are ongoing as 
the United States continues to be confronted by the menace.  Numerous changes and 
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 additions were made to United States counterterrorism policy following 9/11.  An in-
depth description of all of those provisions would be impossible to provide in this study, 
but a discussion of the two pillars, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the 2001 Military 
Order, is presented below.22
 Officially dubbed the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism,” the USA Patriot Act of 
2001 represents the key piece of legislation in the post-9/11 counterterrorism regime.  
The Act was passed on 26 October 2001, hardly six weeks after the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon.  The bill became law with virtually no debate, during the 
midst of an anthrax scare in Congress and without an opportunity for most members to 
even read it (Osher, 2002, pp. 522-523; Minow, 2002).  The Act was enacted to “deter 
and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world” and “to enhance law 
enforcement investigatory tools” (H.R. 3162, 2001).  It grants extensive powers to the 
U.S. government to infringe on privacy rights during counterterrorism investigations. 
  Title II greatly increases the ability of the government to perform searches.  For 
example, the standard procedure for field agents and officials is to knock and make 
known their identity prior to executing warrants.  Section 213 of the Act authorizes “a 
delay of required notices of the execution of a warrant if immediate notice may have an 
adverse result and under other specified circumstances” (H.R. 3162, 2001).  Other parts 
of the Act have far reaching consequences as well.  Section 216 makes all electronic 
communications, including those on the internet, subject to a threshold lower than the 
usual probable cause for the application of pen register or trap and trace device 
                                                 
22 For a overviews of the United States post-9/11 counterterrorism policy, see Less, 2004, pp. 656-729; 
Minnerop, 2004, pp. 761-785; Perl, 2003. 
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 surveillance techniques (H.R. 3162, 2001).23  These new provisions also provide for 
national orders, which remove the requirement for each Court to authorize the order in 
their jurisdiction.  Both sections exemplify those provisions of the Act that might be 
applied generally, not just to terrorism cases.  Other facets of the Act address the 
financing of terrorism, border protection, the removal of obstacles to the investigation of 
terrorism, and the strengthening of criminal laws against terrorism (H.R. 3162, 2001).  In 
order to protect the borders of the country, the Attorney General is permitted to detain an 
alien suspected of terrorism for up to seven days (Doyle, 2002, p. 51).  The Act greatly 
increased the counterterrorism powers of the U.S. government. 
 The second pillar in the U.S. government’s post-9/11 counterterrorism regime is 
the President’s Military Order issued 13 November 2001 on Detention, Treatment, and 
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.  The Order grew out of the 
decision to engage terrorists militarily, and to prepare for the inevitable situation that 
combatants would be captured by the U.S.  It places all those detained under such 
circumstances outside of the jurisdiction of the normal district court system, to be tried by 
a military commission.  President Bush writes that it is not feasible to employ the 
“principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal 
cases in the United States district courts” (Military Order, 2001).  The Order also gives 
the Secretary of Defense the right to detain suspects indefinitely, at any designated 
location, inside or outside of the United States.   
 The Patriot Act of 2001 and the President’s Military Order of 2001 are the main 
facets of the U.S. response to 11 September 2001.  the extent to which government policy 
                                                 
23 Pen registers record the numbers and routing information of messages and calls sent from phones or 
computers.  A trap and trace device records the same information sent to a phone or computer. 
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 shifted away from the previously established counterterrorism equilibrium between 
security and fundamental rights in responding to terrorism is evaluated below using the 
five methods of testing. 
Internal Governmental Scrutiny 
 The traditional checks and balances of the United States Government apply to its 
counterterrorism efforts.  While the formulation and implementation of the nation’s 
counterterrorism regime is left predominantly to the executive, the legislative branch 
actively oversees the various facets of the strategy.  Congressional bodies such as the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees and a special collaboration by the House and 
Senate Select Committees on Intelligence provide supervision of the Government’s 
struggle against terrorism.  These reports are very politically charged, often presenting 
two opposite opinions in the same document.  It was found that the reports acknowledged 
significant policy movement toward security in the wake of 11 September 2001, with a 
slim majority feeling that the shift is justified and necessary to combat the threat.24
 The Congressional oversight of two of the most important, and controversial, 
facets of the counterterrorism regime in the United States, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 
and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, is representative of the process since 11 
September 2001.  Policymakers see both as vastly increasing the powers of the 
government in terms of counterterrorism, and some members lamented the detriment to 
fundamental rights.  The majority opinion in the House Judiciary Committee’s report on 
                                                 
24 Of eight reports analyzed, five felt the shift was justified and necessary, while the other three expressed 
concern over the extent of the movement.  It should be noted that these differences generally appeared to be 
politically motivated, with the committees sharply divided along partisan lines.  By and large, Democrats 
tended to voice serious concerns over increased security measures, while Republicans felt they were both 
vital and effective.  The United States was the country reviewed in this study with the most politicized 
oversight of counterterrorism provisions. 
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 the 2005 reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act recommended the extension of the Act’s 
provisions past the sunset date.  The supporters argued that the Act provided “the 
resources necessary to confront these modern threats,” and did so “without a single 
substantiated allegation of civil liberties violations” (H. Rep. No. 109-174 Prt. 1, 2005).  
The dissenting views in the same report offered a particularly scathing rebuke of the shift 
toward security it represented.  According to them, several provisions of the Act “have 
little to do with combating terrorism, intrude on our privacy and civil liberties, and have 
been subject to repeated abuse and misuse by the Justice Department” (H. Rep. No. 109-
174 Prt. 1, 2005).    The Permanent Committee on Intelligence’s report on the 
reauthorization followed the same pattern.  The majority opinion supported the 
reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act’s powers which resulted in “clear and 
demonstrable” successes since its inception (H. Rep. No. 109-174 Prt. 2, 2005).  The 
opposition members of the Committee sought the modification of several provisions in 
order to better safeguard fundamental rights (H. Rep. No. 109-174 Prt. 2, 2005).  One of 
the few things the two viewpoints agreed upon in both reports was that the USA Patriot 
Act of 2001 represented a “broad expansion” of government powers relating to security 
(H. Rep. No. 109-174 Prt. 1, 2005).  
  The contention that attended the reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 
in 2005 was repeated in 2006 over the Military Commissions Act of 2006.  The House 
Judiciary Committee’s majority opinion recommended the passage of the bill in its 2006 
report.  They saw the Act as a proper response to the necessity to prosecute alien 
unlawful enemy combatants in military commissions, especially as statutory habeas 
corpus was confined to U.S. soil (H. Rep. No. 109-664 Prt. 2, 2006).  The dissenting view 
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 expressed concerns about the removal of habeas jurisdiction from federal courts, reducing 
Geneva Convention compliance, and perceived violations of due process within the 
commission procedures (H. Rep. No. 109-664 Prt. 2, 2006).  The two sides were 
reconciled only on the point that the Act represented a shift in favor of security, made 
necessary by the terrorism threat facing the country.  The Armed Services Committee 
report on the same piece of legislation mirrored that of the House Judiciary Committee.  
Both supporters and dissenters agreed that the Act marked a significant movement toward 
security, though they differed on whether it was necessary or acceptable (H. Rep. No. 
109-664 Prt. 1, 2006).  
 The reports on the reauthorization of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 in 2005 and the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 are representative of the general internal 
governmental scrutiny of the post-9/11 counterterrorism regime.  Two preliminary 
conclusions are readily apparent from the above reports and others that have been 
analyzed.  First, there is an overwhelming sense, even among those who differ over 
whether it is warranted, that there was a major policy shift toward security following 11 
September 2001 that is still, to a lesser extent, underway today.  Second, the oversight of 
the counterterrorism policies of the United States is an incredibly partisan task and must 
thus be examined within that context. 
Judicial Opinion 
 The judiciary plays an important role in overseeing the counterterrorism regime of 
the United States.  It is the branch of government most isolated from partisan politics, and 
thus is uniquely placed to review government policies.  Since 11 September 2001, a 
number of challenges to counterterrorism laws and practices have been filed.  Federal 
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 courts have ruled on four significant cases.  Three of them were decided by the Supreme 
Court, while one decision was handed down at the appellate level.  Three of them were 
decided against the executive and one in favor.  All four of the opinions acknowledge that 
the U.S. government expanded its counterterrorism powers in the wake of 9/11. 
 The appellate court case involved habeas corpus petitions brought by detainees 
against the U.S. government.  In the 2003 decision in Gherebi v. Bush, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals established its jurisdiction in habeas petitions over Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base and the detainees held there.  At the heart of the case was the question of 
whether Congress provided, within the far-reaching Authorization for Use of Military 
Force in 2001, the power to “hold uncharged citizens of foreign nations in indefinite 
detention” (Gherebi v. Bush, 2003).  Though a statement on that specific inquiry was 
outside of the range of the case, the court did decide that, despite the government’s 
arguments, Federal courts possessed the jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions from 
detainees in the “war on terror.”  This decision represented a judicial attempt to impose a 
check on one of the new counterterrorism powers that Congress initiated following 9/11. 
 Three cases brought against the government by detainees have been decided upon 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.  In Rumsfeld v. Padilla (2004), the Court decided in favor of 
the government, dismissing Padilla’s habeas petition because Rumsfeld was not the 
proper respondent and he brought it before the wrong circuit.  The broader question of the 
government’s power to detain civilians militarily in terrorism cases was not addressed 
because the judgment was reached based upon these procedural errors.  Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld (2004) marked a defeat for the U.S. government.  Hamdi was a U.S. citizen 
captured while allegedly fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan.  With his petition, he sought 
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 to gain the right to challenge the government’s classification of him as an enemy 
combatant in a properly constituted tribunal.  The Court ruled that Hamdi “was entitled to 
receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker” (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
2004).  The decision constrained the government’s ability to detain citizens without the 
ability to dispute that detention.  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the petitioner, Hamdan, 
challenged the legality of trial by military commission, as they had been constituted by 
order of the President.  The Supreme Court ruled that the President did not have the 
proper grant of authority from Congress to create military commissions.  The ruling 
limited the ability of the President to setup a second-track legal procedure, similar to 
Diplock courts in the United Kingdom, specifically designed for terrorism-related 
offenses.  The legal restraint was short-lived, however, as this power was granted to the 
President later that year by the Military Commissions Act of 2006.   
In sum, what these cases share is recognition by the judiciary of the significant 
policy shift away from the previous counterterrorism equilibrium toward security in the 
post-9/11 legal framework of the United States, as well as of the need for judicial scrutiny 
of those expanded powers.
External Watchdogs 
 Especially since the events of 9/11 and the government’s reactions to the attacks, 
external watchdogs have kept an eye on the counterterrorism regime of the United States.  
The organizations, such as Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have generally been critical of the policies of 
the U.S.  All of the reports analyzed identified a significant policy shift away from the 
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 previous counterterrorism equilibrium in the post-9/11 policy environment, along with 
serious concerns about the treatment of fundamental rights in the country.   
 The groups all have commented on increased governmental counterterrorism 
powers and questioned the necessity of certain provisions that violate fundamental rights.  
Amnesty International has been one of the most outspoken critics.  In a pamphlet entitled 
Terror and Counter-terror: Defending Our Human Rights, the group claimed to have 
“repeatedly exposed and condemned human rights violations in the name of security” 
(Amnesty International [AI], 2006a, p. 2).  An earlier AI (2005) report stated that the 
U.S. Government, specifically the executive branch, “has sought unchecked power 
throughout the ‘war on terror’ and shown a chilling disregard for international law” (p. 
2).  Since 11 September 2001, the government sought the extension of security measures 
without properly maintaining protections for fundamental rights.  AI identified the pursuit 
of security while preserving fundamental rights as the challenge for governments facing 
terrorism, while reporting that the U.S. “views human dignity and the rule of law as far 
from non-negotiable when it comes to national security” (AI, 2004a, p. 4).  The 
organization often has cited the policy of detention without charge of terrorism suspects 
at Guantanamo as an example of the movement toward security to the detriment of 
fundamental rights (AI, 2004b; AI, 2006b; AI, 2007a; AI, 2007b).  Throughout the eleven 
AI publications on U.S. counterterrorism policy examined, the common thread was one 
of extensive security policies crowding out fundamental rights.   
  Both the ACLU and HRW have also disapproved of the counterterrorism regime 
of the United States.  The ACLU has identified a range of violations of fundamental 
rights in the post-9/11 pursuit of national security.  In a 2006 report, the group wrote that 
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 “the U.S. government, in the aftermath of September 11, chose to fight terrorism by 
picking and choosing what principles of human rights and humanitarian law to apply” 
(American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 2006, p. 3).  Expansive new counterterrorism 
provisions and authority are worrisome, as “excessive power will inevitably be used 
excessively” (ACLU, 2004, p. 2).  The two organizations have also called attention to the 
use of pre-9/11 legal provisions for entirely new purposes in the “war on terror.”  In 
2005, the use of the material witness law for the purpose of holding terror suspects 
became the topic of an HRW and ACLU joint report.  In their opinion, the U.S. struggle 
against terrorism “must include a vigorous affirmation of fundamental rights,” especially 
since the U.S. government is portrayed as repeatedly yielding “to the temptation to abuse 
their powers of arrest and incarceration” (Human Rights Watch [HRW] & ACLU, 2005, 
p. 6).  HRW urged caution in granting new powers to the government and rolling back 
some of the most extensive.  They cited historical precedents to show “how dangerous it 
is to allow government to claim unchecked power to protect national security,” while 
warning that the U.S. was on a similar trajectory (HRW, 2002, p. 5).   
Thus, the overwhelming judgment in reports from both the ACLU and HRW is 
that there has been a massive increase in government powers in the name of 
counterterrorism.  All internationally-recognized watchdogs evaluated in this study share 
this view. 
Media Perception 
 The media in the United States have proven vibrant and outspoken commentators 
on the American counterterrorism regime since 11 September 2001.  A representative 
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 sample of articles from a broad selection of periodicals was examined for this study.25  
Every article identified a considerable policy movement away from the previous 
counterterrorism equilibrium toward greater security, while a majority expressed disquiet 
at the effect on fundamental rights of this movement.26
 The bulk of the analyzed articles found much to criticize in the counterterrorism 
policies of the United States since 9/11.  As has been noted, all documented a major 
amplification of government counterterrorism powers during that period. The terms of the 
deliberation over counterterrorism in the country were elucidated by Philip Gailey in 
December 2001.  He wrote that “the debate over the balance between security and civil 
liberties has been a healthy one” (Gailey, 2001, p. 1D).  While “our liberty cannot rely on 
the good intentions and self-restraint of any president,” many of the new security 
provisions were necessities and not as “draconian” as often believed (Gailey, 2001, p. 
1D).  Some commentators pointed out that, despite the expansiveness of the powers and 
fundamental rights concerns, some policies worked to make the U.S. secure in the face of 
the terrorist threat.  Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at Brookings Institution, urged 
Democrats to preserve the useful, necessary aspects of the counterterrorism regime, 
despite “our government’s excesses” (O’Hanlon, 2007, p. A18).   
The greatest commentary has been on specific counterterrorism policies.  A 19 
August 2003 story in the New York Times, for example, reported that the USA Patriot 
Act, the “sweeping legislation passed after 9/11,” had become “almost a dirty word” 
                                                 
25 The articles were accessed using the LexisNexis database and came from the following newspapers: the 
Washington Times, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the International Herald Tribune, the 
Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, the Boston Globe, USA Today, and the St. Petersburg 
(Florida) Times. 
26 Of thirty articles evaluated, all recognized a major shift toward security in U.S. counterterrorism policy, 
with twenty-two voicing concerns over fundamental rights, six called the provisions justified, and two were 
neutral on the question of fundamental rights. 
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 among civil libertarians, who voiced “increasingly vitriolic concerns over the measure 
and its future” (Lichtblau, 2003, p. 1).  A 2005 article also covered the USA Patriot Act.  
It stated that both liberals and some conservatives had found common ground in 
opposition to the Act, creating a coalition to fight the renewal of its expansive provisions 
(Lakely, 2005, p. A01).  An International Herald Tribune story covered the renewal of 
the USA Patriot Act and the “effort by the Justice Department to further expand 
government powers” (Lichtblau, 2005, p. 4).  The Christian Science Monitor published a 
piece in 2004 which asserted that, despite expansive provisions and widespread criticism, 
“the Patriot Act was absolutely vital to protect America’s security” (Rosenzweig, 2004, 
p. 09).  A 2004 item in The Washington Post reported on an “Anti-Terror Database” 
which represented “one of the most far-reaching changes in response to the Sept. 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks” (O’Harrow, 2004, p. A04).  The development of a 
counterterrorism database in Florida occasioned comment, as it allowed officials to 
instantly access billions of records about ordinary citizens for the first time, a power 
described by one officer as “scary” (O’Harrow, 2003, p. A01).  The newspapers, 
regardless of orientation, shared a perception of a significant increase in government 
counterterrorism powers following 11 September 2001. 
Academic Assessment 
 Academics around the world scrutinize the counterterrorism regime of the United 
States, especially since 11 September 2001 and the country’s aggressive military 
response to the new threat.  These investigators universally identify a significant 
movement of government policy in the United States toward greater and more restrictive 
security measures in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.  A number of scholars also 
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 criticize various policies that, in their opinion, flout international law and impair 
fundamental rights. 
 Many researchers have unambiguously acknowledged the shift in 
counterterrorism policy toward security.  Steven Less (2004) of the Max Planck Institute 
for Comparative Public Law and International Law reported that, following 9/11, the 
topic of terrorism produced a wave of government doings and legal action favoring one 
of two competing concerns: security over rights (pp. 635-642).  For him, new 
counterterrorism policies and “legal developments in the United States after 9/11 are too 
wide-ranging to permit a conclusive assessment” (Less, 2004, p. 728).  Liora Lazarus and 
Benjamin Goold (2007), tutors in Law at Oxford University, discussed the relationship 
between security and rights in a number of Western democracies (pp. 1-24).  For them, 
the movement toward security by governments after 11 September 2001 is a 
manifestation of a preference that existed before that date and had been displayed during 
previous national crises.  They point out that jihadi terrorism offered the United States “a 
novel opportunity to develop new and powerful rhetorical arguments…in favour of 
increased state power” (Lazarus & Goold, 2007, p. 5).  In a comparative study of post-
9/11 counterterrorism policies, Princeton’s Richard Falk (2007) characterized the 
response as one based on the premise that “it was permissible for the U.S. government to 
do whatever it took to make American and Americans as secure as possible” (p. 19). 
David P. Forsythe (2007) of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln criticized the expansive 
powers of indefinite detention and the use of harsh interrogations techniques (including 
some designated as torture by international law) that the government employed following 
11 September 2001 (pp. 37-55).  Harvard Law School professor and former Deputy 
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 Attorney General Philip Heymann (2003) expounded a particularly scathing opinion of 
U.S. counterterrorism policy following 9/11.  The U.S. government was, in his 
estimation, “demanding and justifying a radical shifting of our domestic and international 
priorities” which defied “traditional assumptions about our democratic freedoms” 
(Heymann, 2003, p. 13). 
 Scholars have isolated individual policies that, in their opinion, go too far in the 
direction of security.  Kate Martin (2004) highlighted domestic intelligence practices that 
do not considerably increase safety, but violate fundamental rights.  The U.S. government 
enlarged “domestic intelligence powers and shifted institutional responsibilities for 
intelligence gathering inside the United States,” and simultaneously augmented “the 
potential for serious abuses of power” (Martin, 2004, p. 7).  Brookings Institution 
contributors Benjamin Wittes and Mark Gitenstein (2007) and others (Terry, 2008; Elsea 
& Thomas, 2007) discussed the need for a new detention policy for suspected terrorists 
and enemy combatants, as the current one has proven confusing and controversial.  The 
academic community shares an overwhelming sense of a policy shift toward security in 
the U.S. counterterrorism regime following 9/11.   
Conclusion 
 The United States has little past counterterrorism experience.  The country faces a 
high threat of jihadi terror as the leader of the war in Iraq and the greatest contributor to 
the international presence in Afghanistan.  Based upon the hypothesis presented earlier in 
the study, one would suppose that the United States limited previous experience 
combating domestic terrorism would not prepare it very well to combat the menace of 
jihadi terrorism.  The United States did not possess extensive counterterrorism policies 
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 prior to 11 September 2001.  With little experience and a modest counterterrorism 
structure in place, it was expected that the country would report a significant response to 
the 9/11 attacks.  An exploration of data collected from a variety of sources—including 
judicial opinion, external watchdogs, the media, and academics—suggested that the 
United States did make a considerable movement from the counterterrorism equilibrium 
on 11 September 2001, reacting to the new and imminent threat of terrorist violence. 
 
The Australian Case 
 Australia is a stable liberal democracy with almost no past experience in 
combating terrorism.  In fact, it is the country evaluated in this study with the least 
history of exposure to terrorism.  This lack of experience meant that Australia had little 
counterterrorism policy on the books prior to 11 September 2001.  Given the freedom 
from terrorism in the past, the events of 9/11 profoundly affected the country.  Australian 
participation in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq placed the country on the jihadi 
terrorist radar.  Attacks on Australians in Bali in 2002 and 2005 and on the Australian 
Embassy in Jakarta in 2004 reinforced the new perception of the existence and 
imminence of a direct terrorist threat.  The Australian government has reacted to this 
threat by developing a new counterterrorism framework.  This framework relies heavily 
on counterterrorism legislation.  One would expect government policy in Australia, with 
its almost complete lack of experience with terrorism, to have shifted away from the 
previously established equilibrium between security and fundamental rights in 
responding to terrorism after 11 September 2001. 
Previous Terrorism Experience 
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  The Commonwealth of Australia had very little experience with terrorism or even 
the threat of terrorism prior to 11 September 2001.  David Wright-Neville, writing for the 
Spanish think-tank Real Instituto Elcano, commented that, apart from some small, 
amateur attacks against Yugoslav and Turkish diplomatic installations in the 1970s, “until 
recently Australia has not had a direct experience of terrorism” (Wright-Neville, 2005, p. 
3).  A variety of other sources verified this Australian lack of previous experience with 
terrorism.  Nathan Hancock (2002) noted that “Australia has had little or no experiences 
of terrorism,” thus “there is really no specific anti-terrorism statute in Australia.”  
Michael Head (2003) has also discussed the extent of Australian experience with 
terrorism.  He concluded that the country had little familiarity.  The last terrorist act in the 
Commonwealth was the 1978 bomb that exploded outside a meeting of British 
Commonwealth leaders at the Hilton Hotel in Sydney (Head, 2003, p. 670).  The attack 
remains somewhat of a mystery to this day, as those originally accused of the bombing 
had their sentences subsequently overturned due to police malfeasance.  The Australian 
experience with terrorism had been so limited prior to 11 September 2001 that the 
introduction of a legal conception of terrorism into the country was questioned by 
Australian legal experts (Commonwealth, 1979, as cited in Head, 2003, pp. 670-671).  In 
the context of the United Kingdom and Spain, or even, to a lesser extent, the United 
States, Australia was truly a novice in the realm of counterterrorism as of 11 September 
2001. 
Jihadi Terrorism and Response 
 The Australian attitude toward terrorism, as a threat that would never come to the 
shores of the geographically remote and strategically unimportant country, altered 
 76
 
 discernibly following the 9/11 attacks in the United States.  Perception of the global reach 
of the menace grew and the Australian government took it to heart.  In a 2006 paper 
entitled Protecting Australia Against Terrorism, the Government called terror “a serious 
threat to Australia and Australia’s interests overseas” (Australian Government, 2006a, p. 
8).  According to this report, the peril was “globally dispersed, constantly changing and 
evolving” (Australian Government, 2006a, p. 8).  The greatest danger to the nation was 
seen to come from the amorphous, international terror organization of Al Qaeda, and 
those that bin Laden’s association fund, support, and train.  However, South-East Asian 
regional groups also represented a great threat to Australia.  In particular, Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) was responsible for the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings that resulted in 
significant Australian casualties, as well as the 2004 attack on the Australian embassy in 
Jakarta.  The 2006 report highlighted the continued threat from JI to Australians and 
Australian regional interests (Australian Government, 2006a, p. 9).  The report sounded 
bleak, noting that “the terrorist threat will likely be with us for some time to come” 
(Australian Government, 2006a, p. 10). 
 Following 11 September 2001 and in the face of this perceived threat from jihadi 
terrorism, the Australian Government has built a new counterterrorism regime almost 
from scratch.  Since September 2001, the Australian Government has enacted twenty-
eight federal counterterrorism laws that address a wide variety of controversial issues.27  
The first, key wave of legislation was the five counterterrorism laws passed in June 2002.  
These laws established “sweeping definitions of terrorism and treason, both now 
punishable by life imprisonment” (Head, 2003, p. 667).  They contained powers to ban 
                                                 
27 See the Australian Government’s National Security website for a complete list of the legislation: 
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/826190776D49EA90CA256FA
B001BA5EA?OpenDocument.  
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 political parties and arrest members, while they also reverse the burden of proof for some 
offences, thus requiring a defendant to prove his or her innocence (Head, 2003, p. 667).  
Over the course of the years following the passage of the five laws, the counterterrorism 
regime of the country has been steadily augmented.  The nine laws that arguably 
represent the most important facets of the Australian counterterrorism regime are very 
briefly explored below. 
 The Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2) 2005 is the most recent of the major additions to 
the Australian counterterrorism regime.  The Act changes the Criminal Code to allow the 
listing of a group that advocates carrying out a terrorist attack as a terrorist organization.  
It also establishes procedures for preventative detention and control orders, and 
modernizes the offence of sedition and other measures (Australian Government, 2006b).  
Another important piece of legislation is the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003.  The Act empowers the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to obtain a warrant to detain and 
question any person who may have information significant to the gathering of 
intelligence in relation to terrorist activity (Renwick, 2007, p. 68).  The Criminal Code 
Amendment (Offences Against Australians) Act 2002 amends the Criminal Code by 
making it an offence to murder, commit manslaughter, or intentionally or recklessly 
cause serious injury to an Australian outside of Australia (Australian Government, 
2006b).  This Act extends the jurisdiction of the Australian judiciary to include these 
offences. 
 The Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002 is 
another important piece of legislation in Australian counterterrorism policy.  The Act 
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 makes it a crime to place bombs or other lethal devices in specific locations with the 
intention of causing death or serious injury, or causing widespread damage which could 
cause considerable economic loss (Renwick, 2007, p. 68).  The Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 is yet another piece of the Australian counterterrorism 
framework.  The law changes the Criminal Code Act 1995 to create new terrorism 
offences and update treason offences.  It also creates new offences relating to 
membership or other links to terrorist organizations and their initiatives (Australian 
Government, 2006b).  The Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002 created a 
new offence that targets persons who provide or collect funds and are inattentive as to 
whether that money will be used to aid a terrorist act (Australian Government, 2006b). 
 The Australian Government also passed into law the Telecommunications 
Interception Legislation Amendment Act 2002.  This Act permits Australian law 
enforcement agencies to seek telecommunications interception warrants in connection 
with their investigation of terrorist offences (Renwick, 2007, p. 68).  Another important 
piece of legislation is the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 
(Constitutional Reference of Power).  The law attempts to remove any uncertainty 
regarding the constitutional status of counterterrorism legislation (Australian 
Government, 2006b).  The final major Act looked at in this study is the National Security 
Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004.  The Act seeks to safeguard 
information from disclosure in federal criminal proceedings where the revelation would 
be likely to prejudice Australia’s national security (Australian Government, 2006b). 
 While the above Acts represent only a fraction of the augmentation of the 
Australian Government’s counterterrorism powers, they serve both as exemplars of the 
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 counterterrorism regime and as the most important and controversial facets of it.  The 
operation of the policies and the extent of the government policy shift toward security are 
examined below. 
Internal Governmental Scrutiny 
 The Australian government is subject to an extensive system of oversight.  
Australia and the United Kingdom, with their similar parliamentary systems, have 
comparable mechanisms for examining counterterrorism policy.  In Australia, this task 
has fallen primarily to the Security Legislation Review Committee within the office of 
the Attorney General, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 
and the Australian Law Reform Commission.  Each of these organizations has issued 
reports on the counterterrorism regime of Australia since 11 September 2001.  All reports 
analyzed identified a significant policy shift away from the previous counterterrorism 
equilibrium during this period. 
 Each of the major counterterrorism policy oversight bodies acknowledged a sharp 
increase in government counterterrorism powers over the past seven years.  The Security 
Legislation Review Committee, established by the Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2002 as a public, independent evaluator of Australian security policy, 
issued its findings to the Attorney General in June 2006.28  The report stated that “since 
terrorist attacks in other parts of the world, notably in September 2001, security 
legislation has been enacted with the prime object of preventing or discouraging further 
terrorist attacks” (Security Legislation Review Committee [SLRC], 2006, p. 3).  Over the 
course of their investigations, the committee was “satisfied of the need for separate 
                                                 
28 The body is often referred to in the literature as “the Sheller Committee,” after the chair of the 
committee, the Hon. Simon Sheller QC. 
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 criminal legislation to deal with terrorism as defined by the expression ‘terrorist act,’” 
and did not advise “general repeal of the security legislation” (SLRC, 2006, p. 8).  The 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security issued its own report on 
Australian counterterrorism policy on 4 December 2006.  The inquiry was necessary due 
to the fact that “in mid 2002 the Commonwealth Parliament passed a package of security 
and counter terrorism legislation to strengthen Australia’s capacity to respond to the 
threat of international terrorism,” which was the first phase of the Commonwealth’s 
response to 9/11 (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security [PJCIS], 
2006, p. 1).  The new legislation and provisions were necessary because “Australian 
criminal law was not salient on terrorist crimes before the events of 11 September 2001” 
(PJCIS, 2006, p. 11).  The Committee also acknowledged that “it is uncontroversial that 
terrorism law has developed rapidly since September 11” (PJCIS, 2006, p. 52).   
 The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) also issued a report on the 
counterterrorism regime in 2006.  The ALRC’s investigation centered on the offense of 
“sedition” resurrected in the context of terrorism.29  In general, the report identified an 
extension of the government’s power to regulate freedom of expression when it involves 
terrorism.  The ALRC argued that “recent concerns about the national and international 
security environment” have made questions of restricting speech that aids terrorism 
incredibly relevant (Australian Law Reform Commission [ALRC], 2006, p. 29).  
Particularly following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Australian counterterrorism regime 
was expanded to include offenses like sedition (ALRC, 2006, pp. 30-32).  All internal 
                                                 
29 The revived “sedition” offense in Australia is similar to, though more narrow than, the criminal offense 
of encouraging or glorifying terrorism in the United Kingdom.  
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 governmental scrutiny recognized a significant policy shift toward security away from 
the previous counterterrorism equilibrium in Australian following 11 September 2001.   
Judicial Opinions 
 Australia has a federal system, with both state and federal courts.  This federal 
system, and the lack of a federal bill of rights, severely constrains the ability of the 
judiciary to oversee and challenge counterterrorism legislation.  Yet a number of criminal 
cases have been brought to trial, providing the judiciary with a limited platform for 
commentary on the counterterrorism policies.  The counterterrorism cases that have gone 
through the system up to this point have been mostly confined to the individual states.  In 
all of these cases, those involved discerned a moderate policy shift toward security. 
 The counterterrorism regime of Australia has rarely been tested since 11 
September 2001.  The first person charged under the new counterterrorism legislative 
package passed in 2002 was Zeky Mallah.  He was charged with two counts of preparing 
or planning for a terrorist act and recklessly threatening a Commonwealth official with 
bodily harm (R v. Mallah, 2005, para. 1).  Mallah was acquitted by a jury on the two 
counts relating to terrorism, as the jury did not feel his actions fell within the definition of 
“terrorist act” (R v. Mallah, 2005, para. 26).  He pleaded guilty of threatening a 
Commonwealth officer, and was jailed for two and a half years.  The case revealed the 
limitations of the criminal prosecution of terrorist offences, despite the changes in the 
criminal code and new counterterrorism powers granted in 2002.  
 The case of Joseph “Jihad Jack” Thomas marked the most significant challenge to 
the government’s counterterrorism policies since 9/11.  Thomas was the first person 
convicted under the new counterterrorism laws for intentionally receiving funds from Al 
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 Qaeda and holding a false passport, though his sentence was overturned on appeal based 
upon a legal technicality.  On 28 August 2006, he was subject to the first control order.  
In Thomas v. Mowbray (2007), the control order regime in place against Joseph Thomas 
was upheld by the High Court of Australia.  In the opinion of the court, Chief Justice 
Gleeson wrote that the “defence power” which the government claims in times of 
national security crisis applied to the control order regime.  As long as the country 
remained under the threat of jihadi terrorism (what the Chief Justice called “terrorism of 
the kind proved here”), the Commonwealth demonstrated that “Div 104 of the [Criminal] 
Code…is within the defence power” (Thomas v. Mowbray, 2007, para. 590).  According 
to Gleeson, the extraordinary circumstances of the threat justified the extensive reach of 
the counterterrorism provisions represented by the control orders. 
 Further terrorism-related cases have been brought before the Australian court 
system.  For example, Faheem Khalid Lodhi became the first person convicted of 
preparing for a terrorist attack under the new legislation.  Justice Whealy offered the 
opinion of the court, writing that the conviction came as part of the “package of 
legislation prepared in response to the changed security environment in existence, 
following the terrible events of September 11, 2001” (R v. Lodhi, 2006, para. 90).  With 
the growing threat of terrorism, and the ease with which an open country like Australia 
might fall prey to such a threat, “the obligation of the Court is to denounce terrorism and 
voice its stern disapproval of activities such as those contemplated by the offender here” 
(R v. Lodhi, 2006, para. 92).  In Lodhi’s failed appeal of his sentence, Chief Justice 
Spigelman argued that “a terrorism offence is an outrageous offence and greater weight is 
to be given to the protection of society, personal and general deterrence and retribution” 
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 than the potential for rehabilitation on the part of the offender (Lodhi v. Regina, 2007, 
para. 274).  The overwhelming majority of the judicial opinions evaluated both identified 
a moderate policy movement toward security after 9/11 and acknowledged the necessity 
of such a shift. 
External Watchdogs 
 The counterterrorism regime of Australia is under close scrutiny by non-
governmental organizations.  Human Rights Watch, the Australian Human Rights Centre, 
and the New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties have all issued publications on 
Australian counterterrorism policies since 11 September 2001.  All of the reports 
examined identified a significant movement toward security in the post-9/11 
counterterrorism policymaking of the Australian government.  The organizations have 
also been critical of the ramifications on fundamental rights of this movement. 
 A primary focus of all of the commentary by the groups has been the 
augmentation of government powers in the realm of counterterrorism in the past seven 
years.  In a special “Anti-terrorism” issue of Human Rights Defender, the Australian 
Human Rights Centre evaluated the Australian counterterrorism regime.  Luke Howie 
(2005), a contributor to the issue, wrote that “the most recent reforms to Australia anti-
terrorism legislation represent an extraordinary escalation in attempts to prevent 
terrorism,” which have significant negative consequences on society (p. 22).  Garth 
Nettheim (2005), writing in the same issue, highlighted the fact that “there have been a 
number of legislative changes over the past four years to enlarge the powers of the ASIO 
[Australian Security Intelligence Organization] and other agencies” (p. 6).  He questioned 
the need for a further piece of counterterrorism legislation to be passed by the 
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 government, and wondered “as to the extent to which the sweeping powers that it confers 
can be reconciled with Australia’s commitments to international human rights standards” 
(Nettheim, 2005, p. 8).  Human Rights Watch (HRW) has also commented on the 
Australian counterterrorism regime.  In a 2005 submission to the Australian Senate on the 
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005, HRW expressed concern at the widening of 
counterterrorism powers to include a new sedition offense and the imposition of control 
orders similar to those in the United Kingdom (HRW, 2005). 
The New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties (NSWCCL) has written a 
number of reports on Australian counterterrorism that echo the findings of the Human 
Rights Centre.  In written evidence presented to the International Commission of Jurists 
on the subject of Australian counterterrorism, the NSWCCL emphasized the country’s 
movement toward security.  They wrote that “Australia’s legislative response since 2001 
is characterised by substantial increases in the powers of the security services, the police 
and the Federal Attorney General, and the over-ruling of important human rights with 
limited safeguards” (New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties [NSWCCL], 2006, p. 
4).  In a 2004 submission, the organization called attention to statements by policymakers 
in the government who stated that “there were adequate provisions in place to deal with 
the threats of terrorism” following both 9/11 and the Bali bombings in 2002 (NSWCCL, 
2004, p. 1).  The report then continued on to inquire as to the reason why, if this was the 
case, the government had enacted so much legislation and was attempting to do so again.  
All of the external non-governmental scrutiny examined in this study overwhelming 
identified a significant shift toward security in Australian counterterrorism policy after 11 
September 2001. 
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 Media Perception 
 The media has produced a wide and varied commentary on the Australian 
counterterrorism regime since 11 September 2001.  Articles from a range of periodicals 
were examined.30  All of the pieces recognized a major policy movement away from the 
previous counterterrorism equilibrium toward security, with two-thirds displaying this 
movement as unnecessarily large due to the nature of the terrorist threat to the country.31
 Every analyzed article revealed an augmentation of government counterterrorism 
powers during the period since 9/11.  Many are also critical of the shift.  One 2004 article 
decried the growth as Australia found itself gripped by the fear of terrorism.  The 
country’s main response to the threat was “the creation of new, ever-increasing legal 
powers for counter-terrorism forces” (Ansley, 2004).  Despite “the flood of new laws that 
followed the September 11 terror attacks in the US,” other “drastic measures,” such as 
allowing the detention of those suspected of associating with terrorists, continued to 
become law in Australia (Ansley, 2004).  A similar opinion on Australia’s 
counterterrorism regime pervaded another piece.  Peter Hartcher (2005) wrote of the 
“counter-terrorism legislation that proposes a drastic increase in police powers over 
suspected terrorism” which was due to pass through Parliament soon after the article was 
published (p. 2).  Another article reported that the 7 July 2005 bombings in London 
prompted policymakers to describe the counterterrorism proposals as “draconian” while 
insisting “they are necessary in these times of fear and uncertainty” (“Terror laws,” 
                                                 
30 The articles were accessed using the LexisNexis Academic database and the web-based archives of the 
different periodicals, and represent the following newspapers: The Sydney Morning Herald, The 
Australian, The Courier Mail, The Age (Melbourne), Canberra Times, and The New Zealand Herald. 
31 Of twenty-five articles evaluated, all identified some sort of shift toward security, while seventeen felt 
that there was unnecessary restriction of fundamental rights, seven viewed the provisions as justified or too 
weak, and one was neutral. 
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 2005).  A more recent article explored the necessity of these expanded counterterrorism 
powers in light of their application to a specific case.  Andrew Lynch (2007) suggested 
that Australians “are used to a political insistence on ‘tough’ anti-terrorism laws,” yet 
“these can lead to executive overreach” and do “not make [Australians] safer.”   
 Some articles acknowledged the shift toward security and defended it as 
necessary in the face of the jihadi terror threat to Australia.  In 2007, a piece in The 
Australian pointed out that the counterterrorism policies of the Aussies are hardly unique.  
Essayist Thane Rosenbaum (2007) wrote about a “counterterrorism club” of countries 
that have enacted extraordinary measures to combat the threat of terrorism, noting seven 
liberal democracies including Australia that have done so (p. 15).  Another article 
criticized the inefficiency of the Australian detention law.  It reported that the police ran 
into significant difficulties due to the requirement to apply for pre-charge detention in 
forty-eight hour blocks (Williams, 2007, p. 19).  Former Australian Intelligence Corps 
officer Clive Williams suggested that the blanket twenty-eight day pre-charge detention 
currently employed by the British would be a much better system for Australia, despite 
the litany of concerns voiced about the current fourteen day detention limit (Williams, 
2007, p. 19).  In 2006, the counterterrorism laws were defended in a piece as they were 
put to their first legal test in the trial of Joseph Thomas, who the media dubbed “Jihad 
Jack.”  According to the article, Thomas had enjoyed the full protections of the law 
throughout his trial, where he was convicted under new counterterrorism laws (Munro, 
2006, p. 3).  Whatever their view on the merits of these measures, journalists and 
commentators perceive a significant shift toward security in Australia following 11 
September 2001. 
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 Academic Assessment 
 The counterterrorism regime of Australia has just recently become an object of 
intense academic investigation.  Very few serious scholarly studies were produced prior 
to 2003, and the number has remained modest relative to the other countries presented in 
this study.  The academic evaluations that do exist have highlighted a significant 
government policy shift away from the previously established equilibrium between 
security and fundamental rights in responding to terrorism after 11 September 2001.  
Some possessed considerable fundamental rights concerns about the growing 
counterterrorism regime as well. 
 All of the scholars examined identified a major shift in Australian 
counterterrorism policy toward security.  James Renwick, a barrister and lecturer at the 
University of Sydney, commented on the Australian counterterrorism regime.  He wrote 
that “the remarkable range of counter-terrorism laws enacted since 2001” would have 
been unthinkable prior to 9/11 (Renwick, 2007, p. 67).  He described “the extent of these 
laws” as extraordinary (Renwick, 2007, p. 67).  The scope of counterterrorism legislation 
in the country also became the topic of an article by Gregory Rose and Diana 
Nestorovska of the University of Wollongong.  They characterize the criminal and 
national security laws of Australia as having been “substantially reformed to combat 
terrorism at a furious pace since 11 September 2001” (Rose & Nestorovska, 2007, p. 20).  
The Australian Government took action “following the bombings of the 11 September 
2001 across a range of approaches” (Rose & Nestorovska, 2007, p. 55).  Strategic and 
Defense Studies Centre scholar Christopher Michaelsen compared the development of the 
counterterrorism frameworks of the United Kingdom and Australia following 9/11, while 
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 noting that “in contrast to the United Kingdom, Australia has had little or no experience 
of terrorism” (Michaelsen, 2003).  Michaelsen (2003) then described the passage of the 
five bill package of counterterrorism legislation which was introduced in the Australian 
parliament in March 2002.  This legislative package represented a major increase in 
governmental security powers in terms of terrorism. 
 Some scholars of the Australian counterterrorism regime have revealed serious 
concerns about fundamental rights infringements since 9/11.  Writing in 2005, 
Christopher Michaelsen expressed significant reservations about the augmentation of 
governmental powers to combat terrorism.  He maintained that the “introduction of 
drastic domestic counterterrorism laws is a clear overreaction” (Michaelsen, 2005, p. 
334).  In this view, the new counterterrorism regime was not only ill-conceived, but 
represented a disproportionate reaction to the level of jihadi terrorism threat facing 
Australia. Michaelsen (2005) suggested that “many provisions of Canberra’s 
antiterrorism legislation were motivated by politicians wanting to appear resolute and 
virtuous rather than by legal principle” (p. 334).  These vastly increased governmental 
powers were not likely to be repealed anytime soon, and showed a tendency to “function 
creep”—that is, extend emergency powers into areas of investigation not related to 
counterterrorism (Michaelsen, 2007, pp. 334-335).  Michael Head of the University of 
Western Sydney also raised issues of fundamental rights.  He wrote that, since 11 
September 2001, “the government has introduced legislation and undertaken executive 
action that arguably undermine fundamental democratic rights” (Head, 2003, p. 667).   
 Scholarship thus concurs that there has been a significant shift in Australia toward 
security following 11 September 2001.  
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 Conclusion 
 Australia has nearly no past experience in combating terrorism.  The country 
faces a high threat of jihadi terror as a participant in the war in Iraq and a current troop 
contributor to Afghanistan.  Based upon the hypothesis presented earlier in the study, one 
would suppose that Australia’s lack of previous experience combating domestic terrorism 
would not prepare it to face the menace of jihadi terrorism.  Australia did not possess 
much of a counterterrorism framework prior to 11 September 2001.  With little 
experience and no counterterrorism structure to speak of in place, it was expected that the 
country would report a significant response to the 9/11 attacks.  An investigation of data 
collected from a variety of sources—including judicial opinion, external watchdogs, the 
media, and academics—suggests that Australia did make a considerable movement from 
the societal equilibrium on 11 September 2001, reacting to the unfamiliar threat of 
terrorist violence. 
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 Conclusion 
Since 9/11, nations across the globe have struggled to come to terms with the 
danger of jihadi terrorism.  Each country has formulated its own response, and those 
reactions continue to evolve.  The examination of four cases—the United Kingdom, 
Spain, the United States, and Australia—revealed that countries had diverse reactions to 
the threat of jihadi terrorism following 11 September 2001, specifically in the degree to 
which their counter-terrorism policies shifted away from the previously accepted balance.  
On the other hand, the case studies at best only partially validated the hypothesis that 
countries with extensive previous counterterrorism experience would demonstrate greater 
restraint in their policy response to jihadi terrorism than those without that experience. 
  Spain, the United States, and Australia all generally behaved as predicted by the 
hypothesis.  The United Kingdom, however, did not.  Its policies were expected to remain 
largely in line with the balance previously struck in dealing with IRA activities.  Yet 
instead they shifted very dramatically after 11 September 2001.  The U.K. passed a 
number of new pieces of counterterrorism legislation, introduced new police powers, and 
tightened immigration laws.  By contrast, Spain, as mentioned above, with a small shift in 
counterterrorism policy following 9/11, more closely fit the hypothesis.  The United 
States had the largest movement from the societal equilibrium, a shift motivated by the 
fact that it was the target of the 9/11 attacks.  The United Kingdom and Australia both 
had significant shifts from the societal equilibrium.  Past experience with 
counterterrorism does not shape a country’s response to later perceived threats, and does 
not preclude a radical shift in the orientation of its policies.  It may be a considerable aid 
to combating the new threat —as in the case of Spain—or it could have little bearing on 
the country’s reaction—as in the case of the United Kingdom. 
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 Table 4: Summary of conclusions by type of data. 
 United 
Kingdom 
Spain United States Australia 
Internal 
Governmental 
Scrutiny 
 
Significant 
 
Not Available 
 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Judicial 
Opinions 
 
Significant 
 
 
Small 
 
Significant 
 
Moderate 
External 
Watchdogs 
 
 
Significant 
 
Small 
 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Media 
Perception 
 
 
Significant 
 
Small 
 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Academic 
Assessment 
 
 
Significant 
 
Small 
 
Significant 
 
Significant 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Significant 
 
Small 
 
Significant 
 
Significant 
This table summarizes the conclusions reached in the case studies.  The results are displayed 
in terms of a small shift from the 9/11/01 counterterrorism policy equilibrium, a moderate 
shift, or a significant shift.  The final row shows the general conclusion when all of the 
results were taken together. 
 
 
 There are several possible explanations for a different outcome than that predicted 
by the hypothesis.  The first possible reason for the results is divergent perceptions of the 
nature of the jihadi terrorist threat within the countries.  In Spain, for example, 
policymakers and the public connected specific foreign policy decisions to the high level 
of threat from jihadi terrorism.  Many viewed the Spanish government’s support for and 
troop contribution to the invasion of Iraq as the reason jihadists attacked Spain on 11 
March 2004.  In polls conducted in May 2004 and February 2005 by the Spanish think-
tank Real Instituto Elcano, 64.2% and 62.7% of those polled believed the attacks would 
not have taken place if the country had not supported the U.S. on Iraq (Bermejo & 
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 Reinares, 2007).  The Socialist government that took office after the 2004 attacks 
withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq as a response to the 11 March 2004 bombings. 
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the policymaking establishment has 
viewed the threat through the lens of a conflict over society and culture.  Tony Blair 
(2007), then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, wrote that the struggle between 
terrorist and the West “is not a clash between civilizations; it is a clash about civilization” 
(p. 2).  It is seen as a manifestation of “the age-old battle between progress and reaction, 
between those who embrace the modern world and those who reject its existence—
between optimism and hope, on the one hand, and pessimism and fear on the other” 
(Blair, 2007, p. 2).  In this conception of jihadi terrorism, the United Kingdom, with all 
Western liberal democracies, faces the threat of violence from jihadists despite any 
specific policy followed by that country.  The United States and Australia share Britain’s 
notion of the nature of the terrorist threat.  President George W. Bush (2001) stated that 
the terrorists sought “to disrupt and end a way of life,” while former Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard asserted that “Islamic fanaticism hates the way of life we have” 
(Neales, 2007).  In this conception shared by the three countries, alterations in specific 
policies would not deflect the terrorist threat; thus, policymakers emphasize hardening 
targets and securing the country against an omnipresent menace.  The different 
perceptions of the character of jihadi terrorism might account for the differing reactions 
by the countries to terrorist violence, and the different degrees to which they felt 
compelled to undertake a dramatic change in policies, often at the expense of 
fundamental rights. 
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 Another reason for the different outcomes between Spain and the United 
Kingdom, the two countries with extensive previous experience with terrorism, could be 
the internalization of dissimilar lessons from their previous experience.  Spanish 
policymakers see ETA and jihadi terrorism as two manifestations of the greater terrorism, 
with more similarities than differences.  The Spanish government, with the rather 
successful counterterrorism campaign against ETA, maintains a sense that jihadi 
terrorism can be dealt with using like strategies.  For example, Javier Jordán (2005) of the 
University of Granada, recommended the application of specialized penal policy 
designed to combat ETA to jihadi terrorism.  He argued that the success of the procedure 
of separating and isolating convicted ETA members during incarceration could be 
duplicated if it was applied to jihadists (Jordán, 2005, p. 23).  In short, the Spanish 
government has not perceived much need for expansive new counterterrorism policies 
because the old ones generally seem to work. 
Policymakers in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, have a much different 
perception of the comparability of IRA terrorism and jihadi terrorism.  The two 
movements are seen as completely distinct; the counterterrorism challenges posed by 
each are considered mostly unique.  Tony Blair suggested in 2005 that “IRA political 
demands or their previous atrocities could not be directly compared to fundamentalists 
who carried out the 9/11 US attacks” (“IRA are not al-Qaeda,” 2005).  Negotiation and 
political concessions—especially civil rights agenda for Northern Irish Catholics 
implemented during the 1980s—are given much of the credit for bringing an end to IRA 
violence.32  British policymakers view such negotiation with jihadists as impossible 
                                                 
32 The general effectiveness of many British counterterrorism measures is widely believed to have forced 
the IRA to the table in the first place, and strengthened the British negotiating position. 
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 because jihadists strike “without any claim or pretence to be advancing a negotiable 
cause” (Home Office, 2004, p. 1).  This belief may be traceable to a prevailing official 
conception of jihadi terrorism as a struggle against British core values and culture.  While 
some counterterrorism lessons from Irish violence were applied to international terrorism 
in the Terrorism Act 2000, these were soon deemed insufficient to counter the new threat.  
Five dedicated pieces of counterterrorism legislation have been passed since, applying 
primarily to jihadi terrorism.  Unlike the Spanish government, the British government has 
generally regarded the lessons of IRA terrorism as inapplicable in the struggle against 
jihadi terrorism.  
 Thirdly, responses to jihadi terrorism might also have differed due to distinctive 
legal traditions in Spain as compared to the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Australia.  These differences are readily apparent in the question of pre-charge detention, 
for example.  Spain’s inquisitorial civil law system allows judges to continue to 
interrogate suspects for a period of years after they are charged with a crime (Home 
Office, 2005, p. 26).  The Spanish government has little incentive to increase the length 
of pre-charge detention in the country because it has little bearing on the investigation of 
terrorist suspects.  In the U.K., the U.S., and Australia, which share a common law 
tradition, investigators are no longer able to question a suspect after he or she is charged.  
This stipulation makes the pre-charge detention period extremely important in all crimes, 
but especially terrorism-related offenses, where interrogation might be the only way to 
uncover a cell or halt an attack.  Such a stipulation provides great motivation to a 
government to extend pre-charge detention, which is done through legislation and often 
puts the government at loggerheads with fundamental rights groups.  Pre-charge 
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 detention is just one example of how a country’s legal tradition can affect its 
counterterrorism regime. 
 A final possible explanation for different results than the hypothesis predicted is 
the continuity of leadership since 11 September 2001 in three of the four cases examined.  
In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party has held power since 1998, first under Tony 
Blair, and, after May 2007, under Gordon Brown.  The Liberal Party under John Howard 
controlled the Australian Government continuously from 1996 until December 2007.  
Republican President George W. Bush has been in office since 2001, and will remain 
there until January 2008.  Spain was the only country examined in this study which 
underwent a change in leadership during the period since 11 September 2001, when the 
Socialist Party defeated the Popular Party in the March 2004 election.  As 
counterterrorism policy has become a highly politicized issue, especially in the United 
States, it will be interesting to see how changes in leadership affect the counterterrorism 
regimes of each country.  There is also the question of how a leadership transition 
influences the lessons drawn from previous policy experience.   
 As this study has shown, the relationship between past counterterrorism 
experience and a country’s reaction to future terrorist threats is an elusive one.  So why 
study it?  Two reasons advance themselves.  First, as Art and Richardson (2007) wrote, 
liberal democracies dealing with old domestic terrorism and new jihadi terrorism both 
faced two basic challenges: “how to respond effectively to terrorism without 
compromising democratic liberties, and how to deal effectively with the current 
generation of terrorists without creating more in the process” (p. xiv).  These challenges 
confronted liberal democracies who struggled against terrorism in the past, and continue 
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 to dog those countering it today.  Countries implemented policies that attempted to 
answer these challenges while effectively providing security from those earlier forms of 
terrorism.  It would be foolish not to examine those past policies for lessons that could 
help current liberal democracies succeed in confronting those challenges.  Yet, as this 
study has proven, governments must be careful in doing so, as a multitude of factors 
makes jihadi terrorism and the countering of it very different for each country.  Indeed, 
the United Kingdom illustrated that a nation might even find little application against the 
new threat for its own extensive counterterrorism experience. 
 Second, the policies most effective at answering the two challenges will become 
the basis for an international counterterrorism regime.  The global nature and reach of the 
new jihadi terrorist threat will, in the opinion of the author, eventually move threatened 
liberal democracies toward such transnational policies.  Several events, like the arrest of 
9/11-suspects in Germany and Spain and the foiling of a transatlantic terrorist plot by a 
combination of British and American police, have foreshadowed this movement.  Jihadi 
terrorists are simply too mobile, their organizations too fluid, and their bases too 
widespread to render national strategies effective in the long-term at facing the two 
challenges.  Analyses of each country’s counterterrorism policies, where they come from, 
and how effectual they have been in the past will prove very useful to the establishment 
of an international counterterrorism policy.  Granted, the international community has a 
long way to go before that becomes a reality; a consensus definition of terrorism does not 
yet even exist.  One day, however, comparative examinations of national 
counterterrorism regimes like this study will aid the formulation of international 
counterterrorism policies necessary to counteract a threat like jihadi terrorism. 
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